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INTRODUCTION 
Most contract litigation requires courts to give meaning to 
contracts using doctrines of interpretation and implied terms. 
The most ambitious of these doctrines is the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. According to the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts (Restatement), “[e]very contract imposes 
upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its 
performance and its enforcement,”
1
 and the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing is well established in most American 
jurisdictions.
2
 Though few doubt its significance,
3
 the duty’s 
meaning is notoriously unclear. Good faith is “an intangible 
and abstract quality with no technical meaning”;
4
 its fellow 
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 1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). 
 2. See Steven J. Burton & Eric G. Andersen, The World of a Contract, 75 
IOWA L. REV. 861, 869 (1990) (noting that the implied duty of good faith and 
fair dealing is “standard common law doctrine”). Texas is a rare exception to 
the general consensus in favor of a general common-law duty of good faith and 
fair dealing. There, “the duty of good faith and fair dealing has only been ap-
plied to protect parties who have a special relationship based on trust or une-
qual bargaining power.” Natividad v. Alexsis, Inc., 875 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Tex. 
1994); see also Mark Gergen, A Cautionary Tale About Contractual Good Faith 
in Texas, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1237 (1994) (criticizing the Texas Supreme 
Court’s limited application of good faith). 
 3. Robert S. Summers, Good Faith Revisited, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 723, 
726 (2009) (“I believe there is no obligation in all of the U.C.C. and in general 
contract law of more overall importance than the general obligation of good 
faith.”). 
 4. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 693 (6th ed. 1990). 
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traveler, “fair dealing,” is no more precise.
5
 Determining the 
scope of such “nebulous” standards has caused courts “intracta-
ble difficulty.”
6
 Exasperation with the case law on good faith 
and fair dealing is commonplace among contracts scholars, who 
have confessedly had “very little success in agreeing on stand-
ards that might give a court guidance.”
7
  
This Article aims to make sense of good faith and fair deal-
ing by showing that it is an underenforced legal norm. Let me 
explain. Much of the difficulty with good faith and fair dealing 
involves a mismatch between, on one hand, what legislatures 
and judges say and, on the other hand, what judges do. At first 
glance, the doctrine seems to demand that parties adhere to 
lofty standards of contractual conduct: the Restatement states 
that the duty involves “faithfulness to an agreed common pur-
pose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other 
party.”
8
 The Uniform Commercial Code’s (U.C.C.; the Code) 
general definition of good faith encompasses both “honesty in 
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of 
fair dealing.”
9
 The duty, one court recently said, is breached 
when a party “exercises discretion authorized in a contract in 
an unreasonable way.”
10
 These ways of expressing the duty 
seem to give judges and juries a powerful role in pronouncing 
on the appropriateness of the parties’ post-formation conduct, 
regardless of whether the contract’s text explicitly forbids the 
defendant’s action.  
But in the real world of litigation, the application of good 
faith and fair dealing has generally fallen short of these de-
manding ideals. The case law is replete with judges expressing 
the need for caution,
11
 and courts have devised various 
restrictive doctrinal tests that make it difficult to establish a 
 
 5. The term did not even merit a definition in the sixth edition of 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY. 
 6. Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations on the Obligation of Good Faith, 1981 
DUKE L.J. 619, 619–20 (1981).  
 7. James J. White, Good Faith and the Cooperative Antagonist, 54 SMU 
L. REV. 679, 680 (2001). 
 8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981). 
 9. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2014) (emphasis added). The definition of good 
faith under the Code has evolved over the years, as explained in Part I.A. in-
fra. 
 10. Montanez v. HSBC Mortg. Corp. (USA), 876 F. Supp. 2d 504, 513 
(E.D. Pa. 2012) (quoting Phila. Plaza-Phase II v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & 
Sav. Ass’n, No. 3745, 2002 WL 1472337, at *6 (Pa. Ct. C.P. June 21, 2001)). 
 11. See, e.g., Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Cincinnati Bell Cellular Sys. 
Co., 708 A.2d 989, 992 (Del. 1998) (“[I]mplying obligations based on the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing is a cautious enterprise.”).  
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breach of the duty.
12
 When evaluating the defendant’s perfor-
mance, courts sometimes use deferential standards of review,
13
 
akin to corporate law’s business judgment rule. In addition, 
courts often require plaintiffs to establish a bad motive, trick-
ery,
14
 or some other form of particularly egregious conduct by 
the defendant.
15
 Another way that courts make it difficult to in-
voke the duty is to place challenging evidentiary burdens upon 
those claiming breaches.
16
 Further, in some contexts, 
particularly suits challenging terminations of employment, 
many courts effectively refuse to apply the doctrine of good 
faith and fair dealing.
17
 And some judges are hostile to any 
doctrine that allows the implication of terms beyond the 
contract’s express text.
18
  
In response to this clear divergence between the rhetoric of 
good faith and the reality of judicial enforcement, scholars have 
articulated two main ways of closing the gap. Advocates of lit-
eralism in the interpretation and construction of contracts con-
tend that courts should “level down” the rhetoric of good faith 
to match the reality of their enforcement practices.
19
 Some go so 
far as to say that American courts should abandon their dec-
ades-long experiment with the doctrine of good faith perfor-
 
 12. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Implied Obligation of Good Faith in 
Contract Law: Is It Time To Write Its Obituary?, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 10–
12, 21 (2009) (“[M]ost courts balk at giving the obligation real substantive force 
and effect.”).  
 13. E.g., Svela v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 807 F.2d 1494, 1501 (9th Cir. 
1987) (refusing to engage in “judicial second-guessing of the economic deci-
sions of franchisors”). 
 14. E.g., Mkt. St. Assocs. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 1991) (Pos-
ner, J.).  
 15. E.g., Unishippers Global Logistics, LLC v. DHL Express (USA), Inc., 
526 F. App’x 899, 910 (10th Cir. 2013) (finding that the freight service compa-
ny’s conduct in terminating a long-term services agreement “[did] not rise to 
the level of action so egregious as to constitute a breach of good faith” under 
Utah law). 
 16. E.g., Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234, 
1238–39, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that plaintiffs suing the federal gov-
ernment for breach of the implied covenant must provide clear and convincing 
evidence of bad faith). 
 17. E.g., Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 851 (Kan. 1987) (“[T]he 
principle of law stated in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 . . . is overly 
broad and should not be applicable to employment-at-will contracts.”). 
 18. E.g., Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 
F.2d 1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (“[P]rinciples of good faith . . . 
do not block use of terms that actually appear in the contract.”). 
 19. E.g., Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley 
Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (“There is no blan-
ket duty of good faith . . . . Contract law does not require parties to behave al-
truistically toward each other.”).  
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mance.
20
 Supporters of a more extensive judicial role take the 
opposite approach. In the face of weak enforcement practices, 
they contend that courts should “level up” those practices to 
bring them into line with expansive conceptions of fairness.
21
  
Contending that the duty can usefully be understood as an 
underenforced legal norm, this Article offers a way to reconcile 
rhetoric and judicial enforcement in good faith and fair dealing. 
The duty is valid as a legal norm to the fullest extent, requiring 
parties to treat each other reasonably when exercising 
contractual discretion. But the rules of decision applied by the 
courts when adjudicating disputes over good faith and fair 
dealing involve only partial enforcement of the norm’s 
demands. Judicial decision rules draw their inspiration from 
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, but courts, due to their 
limited competence, do not attempt to exhaust the duty’s 
content. Underenforcement is particularly likely to make sense 
where other mechanisms for checking unreasonable contractual 
conduct—especially self-help and reputational sanctions—are 
available and likely to be effective. Though courts may have 
overreacted to the difficulties of adjudicating breaches of good 
faith and fair dealing, I contend that some degree of 
underenforcement of the norm is sensible.  
Contrary to the assumption common to the leveling-up and 
leveling-down strategies,
22
 then, I contend that legal obligation 
in the law of contracts can exist in a particular instance even 
though the legal system will not attach a sanction to some in-
stances of its breach. To explain how this can be so, I adopt Me-
ir Dan-Cohen’s distinction between conduct rules and decision 
rules.
23
 Like any other legal rule, the law of good faith and fair 
dealing can be understood both as a rule of conduct directed at 
 
 20. E.g., Harold Dubroff, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Contract 
Interpretation and Gap-Filling: Reviling a Revered Relic, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 
559, 562 (2006). 
 21. See, e.g., Emily M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expan-
sive Equality Approach to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 
CORNELL L. REV. 1025, 1029 (2003) (arguing for judicial enforcement of “ex-
pansive notions of equality” via the good faith doctrine); Richard E. Speidel, 
Article 2 and Relational Sales Contracts, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 789, 797 (1993) 
(courts should find bad faith where “one party’s conduct deviates from internal 
norms generated by the relationship”). 
 22. For an explicit statement of this generally held assumption, see Greg-
ory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726, 1728, 1780 n.167, 1783 (2008) (assuming, for the sake of 
argument, that “a contractual obligation might exist without any sanction at-
tached to breach,” but claiming “that is not the contract law we have”). 
 23. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Sep-
aration in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 627 (1984).  
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the parties (a conduct rule) and as a set of rules directed at 
courts tasked with enforcing the norm (decision rules).
24
 
Though we generally expect conduct rules and decision rules to 
align, my suggested way forward allows them to diverge in the 
good faith and fair dealing context: the conduct rule extends to 
behavior not covered by the decision rules.  
Though mostly absent from private law scholarship,
25
 the 
notion of underenforced legal norms is established in other are-
as of the law. The idea is particularly well known in constitu-
tional law, where scholars have long argued that it is justifiable 
for gaps to open up between the meaning of the Constitution 
and the doctrines the courts devise for its enforcement.
26
 
Justiciability doctrines like the political question doctrine pro-
vide the most obvious instances of the courts holding their 
fire.
27
 More subtly, the doctrines the courts have devised for ad-
judicating equal protection cases—particularly the rule of ra-
tional basis review that governs ordinary cases—fall short of 
full enforcement.
28
 Courts refrain from full enforcement of con-
stitutional norms because of the special limitations and pitfalls 
of judicial action.
29
 Similar ideas are at work in a recent vein of 
corporate law scholarship. In that field, scholars have noted a 
disparity between standards of conduct and standards of re-
view in the law of directors’ and officers’ duties.
30
 Without mak-
ing the link with constitutional law, one writer has recently ar-
gued that directors’ and officers’ duties are underenforced and 
that partial underenforcement is a justifiable response to the 
institutional limitations of courts and judicial sanctions.
31
 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. One exception is Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right To 
Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 593, 609–10 (2008) (distinguishing between conduct rules and 
decision rules in property law). It seems the closest anyone has come to using 
the distinction in the scholarship on good faith and fair dealing is Jane Staple-
ton’s contention that English courts respond episodically to concerns like good 
faith and reasonableness through the use of “incidence rules.” Jane Stapleton, 
Good Faith in Private Law, 52 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1, 28–30 (1999). 
 26. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicially Manageable Standards and Consti-
tutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1274, 1278–79 (2006). 
 27. See id. at 1280. 
 28. See infra Part II.A.2 for an examination of this form of 
underenforcement. 
 29. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 
72 MINN. L. REV. 311, 321–24 (1987). 
 30. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and 
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 438 (1993). 
 31. Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 519, 550–51 (2012).  
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In the same way that a constitutional norm or a rule of 
corporate law can be valid and binding on government actors or 
corporate office-holders even though the courts will not always 
award a remedy for its violation,
32
 the norm of good faith and 
fair dealing binds parties even though they face no risk of legal 
sanction for certain kinds of breach.
33
 The insight that good 
faith and fair dealing is an underenforced legal norm provides 
both an explanation for the current state of the doctrine and 
the beginnings of a suggested way forward. In brief, we should 
abandon the search for a single, crisp definition of good faith 
and fair dealing that courts can apply in every case. Instead, 
we should be moving toward a series of sub-doctrines applicable 
to different contexts. Because the relative effectiveness of 
courts and non-judicial sanctions varies greatly in different 
contexts, we should not be surprised that the courts have been 
more receptive to good faith claims in some areas than in oth-
ers.
34
 This kind of doctrinal elaboration would not provide a re-
placement for the norm of good faith and fair dealing, any more 
than “tiers of scrutiny” in constitutional law replace the consti-
tutional norm of equal protection. Rather, we should be seeking 
a set of judicially manageable standards inspired by the norm 
of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of contracts.  
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I explain the de-
velopment of the good faith and fair dealing norm in American 
contract law, emphasizing the gap between the rhetoric of good 
faith and fair dealing and the reality of judicial practice. In 
Part II, I explain the notion of underenforced norms in consti-
tutional law, focusing particularly on the example of the Four-
teenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. I also canvass 
the literature on the divergence between standards of conduct 
and standards of review in corporate law. Armed with insights 
from constitutional and corporate law, I return in Part III to 
good faith and fair dealing in contracts. The parallels between 
these contexts are, I claim, illuminating in several ways. I ex-
plore the reasons why courts or legislators would deliberately 
choose to announce a broad norm of good faith and fair dealing 
while eschewing full judicial enforcement. In Part IV, I exam-
ine the normative implications of the insight, making a series 
 
 32. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of 
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213 (1978). 
 33. See Part III.B infra (describing how the availability of alternative 
sanctions makes up for the underenforcement of the norm). 
 34. Stock contracts and franchise statutes are two examples of areas 
where courts accept arguments about good faith to differing degrees. See Part 
IV.A. infra. 
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of doctrinal proposals.  
I.  GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING: RHETORIC AND 
REALITY   
The duty of good faith and fair dealing is a tool that helps 
courts discern the meaning of, or to fill gaps in,
35
 contracts that 
the parties have already concluded.
36
 Contracts are notoriously 
incomplete.
37
 Lacking infinite foresight and endless time to 
clarify their potential future entitlements and responsibilities, 
contracting parties do not provide specifically for every contin-
gency that might arise during the course of performance. By 
accident or by design, then, contracts give parties discretion in 
the ways that they perform and enforce their mutual 
obligations. In turn, this discretion creates a risk that it will be 
exercised in a purely self-interested or opportunistic way. But 
the courts are not powerless to police exercises of post-
contractual discretion. Various interpretive or gap-filling doc-
trines allow the courts to imply terms restraining some kinds of 
 
 35. I sidestep the debate over whether good faith and fair dealing is, on 
one hand, a doctrine of interpretation, or, on the other hand, an invitation for 
judges to fill gaps in incomplete contracts how they see fit. My arguments are 
intended to be compatible with both views. For a recent defense of the view 
that good faith and fair dealing holds the parties to the correct interpretation 
of their own agreement, see Daniel Markovits, Good Faith As Contract’s Core 
Value, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 272 (Gregory 
Klass et al. eds., 2014). For the gap-filling view, see, for example, Koehrer v. 
Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 828 (Ct. App. 1986) (“[T]he obligations 
stemming from the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing are im-
posed by law as normative values of society.”); see also Summers, supra note 3, 
at 226 (“[Good faith] can fill significant gaps in contracts.”). 
 36. American courts do not apply the duty to the precontractual phase, 
though they will generally enforce an express precontractual agreement to ne-
gotiate in good faith. See, e.g., SIGA Techs., Inc. v. PharmAthene, Inc., 67 A.3d 
330, 333–34 (Del. 2013) (reaffirming that an explicit agreement to negotiate in 
good faith is enforceable under Delaware law). In some jurisdictions, courts 
are willing to find implied agreements to negotiate in good faith once the par-
ties have agreed on major terms but have left other terms open. See Teachers 
Ins. & Annuity Ass’n v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 507–08 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(regarding New York law); see also Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, 
Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 661, 
664 n.7 (2007) (“[T]hirteen states, sixteen federal district courts, and seven 
federal circuits [follow the Tribune approach].”). Even in the absence of an ex-
press or implied agreement to negotiate in good faith, American courts some-
times police bad faith conduct using other doctrines, including promissory es-
toppel. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 133 N.W.2d 267, 273–75 (Wis. 
1965). 
 37. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agree-
ments, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1641 (2003) (“All contracts are incomplete. 
There are infinite states of the world and the capacities of contracting parties 
to condition their future performance on each possible state are finite.”). 
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self-interested behavior, even if the parties have not explicitly 
written such constraints into their contracts. Perhaps the most 
important of these doctrines is the implied duty of good faith 
and fair dealing. 
Below, I chart the divergence between the expansive terms 
in which most legislatures and courts have defined the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing (Section A) and the limited extent to 
which courts have actually enforced the duty (Section B), a di-
vergence that has already been noted by other scholars. I then 
explain two common strategies for closing the gap between the 
rhetoric of good faith performance and its actual enforcement: 
what I call the the “leveling-down” strategy, and the less 
popular “leveling-up” strategy (Section C).  
A. THE DEFINITIONAL TRIUMPH OF COMMERCIAL 
REASONABLENESS 
For centuries, the common law generally took a cautious 
approach to the idea of good faith in contracts, despite Lord 
Mansfield’s claim in the 1760s that good faith is the basis of all 
contracts and dealings.
38
 Until the twentieth century, the no-
tion of good faith appeared most prominently in the common 
law in disputes over title to property and negotiable instru-
ments, where it continues to play a crucial role in the doctrine 
of good faith purchase.
39 
In these cases, good faith was, and is, 
essentially a state of mind—innocence, or lack of notice.
40
 Be-
cause courts generally refrained from assessing the reasona-
bleness or diligence of a purchaser’s inquiries, good faith was 
sometimes known as the rule of the “pure heart and the empty 
head.”
41
 The distinct notion of good faith as a source of duties to 
one’s contractual counterparty was limited in the nineteenth 
century to fiduciary relations and to certain insurance con-
tracts.
42
  
New York appears to have been the first American juris-
diction to embrace good faith performance as a general doc-
 
 38. Boone v. Eyre, (1789) 126 Eng. Rep. 148 (K.B.); 1 H. Bl. 273; Carter v. 
Boehm, (1766) 97 Eng. Rep. 1162 (K.B.) 1164. 
 39. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and Commercial 
Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 
668–69 (1963) (distinguishing “good faith purchase” and “good faith perfor-
mance” under the U.C.C., and noting that the U.C.C.’s recognition of good 
faith performance revived a largely forgotten principle from Roman law). 
 40. See id. at 668. 
 41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. b (1981).  
 42. See McLanahan v. Universal Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 170, 185–86 
(1828). 
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trine.
43
 In the 1933 case of Kirk La Shelle Co. v. Paul Arm-
strong Co.,
44
 the defendants settled a copyright lawsuit with the 
plaintiff by agreeing to pay the plaintiff half of the receipts 
from the revival of a play. The agreement gave the plaintiff ap-
proval rights over all arrangements, except the motion picture 
rights. At the time of the agreement, all motion pictures were 
silent. After the advent of talking motion pictures, the defend-
ants sold all the motion picture rights without seeking the 
plaintiff’s approval. This course of action was seemingly per-
mitted by the words of the agreement, but the New York Court 
of Appeals nevertheless ruled that it was a breach of contract. 
The court stated that the defendants had “assumed a fiduciary 
relationship which had its origin in the contract.”
45
 In fact, the 
court stressed that there was nothing special about this partic-
ular contract; rather,  
in every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party shall 
do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the 
right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which 
means that in every contract there exists an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing.
46
 
Over the next twenty-five years, several other jurisdictions 
adopted a general duty of good faith and fair dealing, in terms 
broadly similar to New York’s.
47
  
The adoption of the U.C.C. provided a major leap forward 
for good faith in American contract law. The U.C.C. itself 
 
 43. By contrast, civil law countries allowed good faith a more general role. 
For example, section 242 of the German Civil Code, which came into force in 
1900, provides that a person subject to an obligation under the Code is 
obligated to perform in such a manner as good faith (Treu und Glauben) 
requires, taking into account general practice. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 
[BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jan. 1, 1900, as amended Jan. 1, 1992, translated by Si-
mon L. Goren (1994), at xiii, §242 at 41. The German courts have used the 
idea of good faith for a variety of creative purposes, including imposing 
precontractual liability, protecting third parties, and, most famously, revising 
price terms in the wake of the hyperinflation crisis of the 1920s. For an over-
view, see Werner F. Ebke & Bettina M. Steinhauer, The Doctrine of Good 
Faith in German Contract Law, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW 
171 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds., 1995); see also JOHN P. DAWSON, 
THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 461–79 (1968). 
 44. 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933).  
 45. Id. at 166. 
 46. Id. at 167 (emphasis added). For a similar, earlier statement, see 
Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 104 N.E. 622, 624 (N.Y. 1914).  
 47. See, e.g., World’s Exposition Shows, Inc. v. B.P.O. Elks, 186 So. 721, 
723 (Ala. 1939); Universal Sales Corp. v. Cal. Press Mfg. Co., 128 P.2d 665, 
677 (Cal. 1942); Martindell v. Lake Shore Nat. Bank, 154 N.E.2d 683, 690 (Ill. 
1958); Clark v. State St. Trust Co., 169 N.E. 897, 903 (Mass. 1930); Salem 
King’s Prods. Co. v. Ramp, 196 P. 401, 409 (Or. 1921). 
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provides that “[e]very contract or duty within [the Code] 
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or 
enforcement.”
48
 In addition to the general requirement, the 
Code requires parties to observe a good faith standard in more 
than fifty specific provisions.
49
 Karl Llewellyn, the Chief Re-
porter and principal architect of the U.C.C., was primarily re-
sponsible for the Code’s adoption of a general obligation of good 
faith.
50
 The obligation of good faith was a crucial part of Llewel-
lyn’s more general project of reforming the classical law of con-
tract to bring it into line with the norms generally accepted by 
businesspeople, with the aim of ensuring that commercial law 
would be flexible enough to keep pace with changes in commer-
cial practice.
51
  
Llewellyn also proposed his own definition of good faith 
under the Code. Before the Code, the idea of “good faith” was 
mostly used as a precondition for a purchaser wishing to assert 
good title to an item of property despite the seller’s lack of au-
thority to do so. Debates over how to define the term in that ar-
ea of law had long focused on whether good faith depended sole-
ly on the relevant party’s actual state of mind (a “subjective” 
standard) or turned instead on whether the party had complied 
with standards of reasonable behavior (an “objective” stand-
ard). In keeping with Llewellyn’s expansive vision for commer-
cial law, his initial proposed definition of good faith in the Code 
was broad, encompassing both “honesty in fact in the conduct 
or transaction concerned” and “observance by a person of the 
reasonable commercial standards of any business or trade in 
which he is engaged.”
52
 But, at least initially, Llewellyn did not 
 
 48. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2014).  
 49. See REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 2002-2003, at 37 (2004); Robert S. 
Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 195 n.2 (1968). 
 50. Llewellyn drew both on existing American precedents and on German 
law. See James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on 
Llewellyn’s German Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 
156, 157–58, 162–63, 166–67 (1987) (noting the affinity between Llewellyn’s 
vision of commercial law and the views of some nineteenth-century German 
legal scholars). Compare supra note 47 (listing some earlier American good 
faith cases), with supra note 43 (discussing good faith in German law). 
 51. In addition to the good faith provisions, Llewellyn was also behind the 
Code’s adoption of a lax parol evidence rule and also the Code’s directions to 
courts to consider usages of trade, courses of performance, and courses of deal-
ing in contract adjudication. See David G. Epstein et al., Fifty: Shades of 
Grey—Uncertainty About Extrinsic Evidence and Parol Evidence After All The-
se UCC Years, 45 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 925, 937–39 (2013). 
 52. U.C.C. § 1-201(18) (May 1949 Draft).  
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entirely get his way when it came to the definition of good faith. 
His inclusion of a reasonableness requirement in the draft Code 
drew criticism from some practicing lawyers involved in the 
U.C.C. project, who objected to the legalization of commercial 
morality, and voiced fears that customers would be encouraged 
to bring unjustified suits for supposed failures to comply with 
reasonable standards of behavior.
53
 The ABA Section of Corpo-
ration, Banking, and Business Law thus urged a narrower def-
inition of good faith, limited to honesty in fact and “the absence 
of trickery, deceit or improper purpose.”
54
 
The U.C.C.’s drafters adopted a compromise. They agreed 
that the Code’s overarching obligation of good faith in the per-
formance and enforcement of commercial obligations should be 
restricted to “honesty in fact.”
55
 But in Article 2, which governs 
sales of goods, the drafters applied Llewellyn’s broader view of 
good faith to cases where the party performing or enforcing an 
obligation was a merchant, requiring merchants to observe 
“reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”
56
 This com-
promise was ultimately incorporated into the first version of 
the Code’s Official Text, approved in 1962.
57
 And even the seem-
ingly narrower term “honesty in fact” was subject to broad 
readings by the Code’s proponents. Commending the Code to 
New York’s legislators, Edwin Patterson contended that “hon-
esty in fact” encompassed requirements of “generosity” and “co-
operation,” and that it would mitigate the effects of “hard luck” 
in commerce.
58
 
In this form, good faith became a major part of commercial 
law in the jurisdictions adopting the U.C.C.—all of the states 
and the District of Columbia
59
—and the idea soon spread far 
 
 53. Walter D. Malcolm et al., Report of Committee on the Proposed Com-
mercial Code, 6 BUS. LAW. 119, 127 (1951) (“Why should the Code draftsmen 
tell us to be good? Businessmen, or at least most of them, carry on business 
ethically and did so long before the Code was ever conceived. The Code should 
not try to prescribe morals.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 54. Id. at 128. 
 55. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1962). 
 56. Id. § 2-103(1)(b). 
 57. See id. §§ 1-201(19), 2-103(1)(b). 
 58. 1 STATE OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 
1955, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 310–15 (1955). 
 59. Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have also adopted the 
U.C.C. See, e.g., Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), DUKE LAW, https://law 
.duke.edu/lib/researchguides/ucc/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2015). Louisiana has 
not adopted Article 2 of the U.C.C., though it has adopted Article 1 and several 
other Articles. Uniform Commercial Code Locator, LEGAL INFO. INST., https:// 
www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/ucc (last visited Apr. 21, 2015). 
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beyond the Code. Robert Summers’s 1968 article on good faith 
was an important step along the way to the widespread 
adoption of a general obligation in American contract law.
60
 Us-
ing an idea borrowed from the philosophy of language,
61
 
Summers claimed that good faith was an “excluder”—it served 
to exclude a wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith.
62
 
Summers’s own nonexhaustive list of categories of bad faith 
performance included: (1) evasion of the spirit of the deal, (2) 
lack of diligence and slacking off, (3) willfully rendering only 
substantial performance, (4) abuse of a power to specify terms, 
(5) abuse of a power to determine compliance, and (6) 
interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party’s 
performance. In Summers’s view, the U.C.C.’s general 
definition as “honesty in fact” was plainly too narrow, for there 
are several categories of non-dishonest bad faith.
63
  
In turn, Summers’s conception of good faith influenced 
Robert Braucher, who drafted section 205 of the Restatement.
64
 
That provision states that “[e]very contract imposes upon each 
party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance 
and its enforcement.”
65
 By using both of the U.C.C.’s terms—
”good faith” and “fair dealing”—the Restatement made clear 
that the duty extended beyond an honesty requirement. Accord-
ing to the comments to section 205, in the particular context of 
contract performance and enforcement, good faith “emphasizes 
faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with 
the justified expectations of the other party.”
66
 Adopting the 
“excluder” analysis, the comments continue by saying that good 
faith “excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as 
involving ‘bad faith’ because they violate community standards 
of decency, fairness or reasonableness.”
67
 Again echoing Sum-
 
 60. See generally Summers, supra note 49. 
 61. See J.L. AUSTIN, SENSE AND SENSIBILIA 70–71 (1962); see also Roland 
Hall, Excluders, 20 ANALYSIS 1 (1959) (discussing excluders); cf. Dennis M. 
Patterson, Wittgenstein and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance 
and Enforcement Under Article Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 335, 348–49 (1988) 
(criticizing Summers’ application of the philosophical concept of excluders). 
 62. Summers, supra note 49, at 201. 
 63. See id. at 204. 
 64. See Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing—Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810, 810 
(1982) (“Professor Braucher acknowledged that an article I wrote . . . substan-
tially influenced the recognition and conceptualization of good faith in section 
205.”). 
 65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). 
 66. Id. § 205 cmt. a. 
 67. Id. 
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mers, the comments state that “[a] complete catalogue of types 
of bad faith is impossible,” and recite Summers’s list of types of 
bad faith conduct as illustrations.
68
  
The vast majority of American jurisdictions have adopted 
the duty as a matter of general contract law; many have explic-
itly endorsed the Restatement approach.
69
 State and federal 
statutes governing particular classes of contracts contain 
similar requirements.
70
 Moreover, over time, various amend-
ments to the U.C.C. extended the “objective” standard of com-
mercial reasonableness to various contexts beyond Article 2.
71
 
Eventually, the Code’s definition of good faith flipped, so that 
commercial reasonableness now constitutes the general rule. 
Since 2003, the Official Text of the U.C.C. now essentially rein-
states Llewellyn’s definition of good faith, defining the term as 
“honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing.”
72
 Though some states continue to 
limit the general definition of good faith in their version of 
U.C.C. to “honesty in fact,” most jurisdictions now adopt the 
broader view as a general matter.
73
  
For the most part, then, the American law of good faith 
provides that those performing and enforcing contractual obli-
gations must observe standards of “fair dealing” or “commercial 
reasonableness.” As envisaged by influential contracts scholars 
like Llewellyn and Summers, the good faith duty requires sub-
stantial deference to the other party’s interests, beyond what 
the terms of the formal document demand. Courts have used a 
variety of formulations to reflect the understanding that good 
 
 68. Id. § 205 cmt. d. 
 69. See, e.g., Beidel v. Sideline Software, Inc., 811 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 2012) (“The rule that parties to a contract act in good faith is univer-
sal.”).  
 70. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (2012) (providing automobile franchisee 
with a cause of action against an automobile manufacturer who fails to “act in 
good faith in performing or complying with any of the terms or provisions of 
the franchise”); Id. § 2802(b)(3)(D) (franchisor terminating franchise arrange-
ment for reason other than franchisee misconduct must do so “in good faith 
and the normal course of business”).  
 71. For example, Article 2A of the U.C.C., which governs leases of goods, 
applied the broader standard to merchants from its inception. See U.C.C. § 2A-
103(4) (2014). 
 72. U.C.C. § 1-201(20) (2014). The Code continues to exempt Article 5, 
which governs letters of credit, from the commercial reasonableness standard. 
Id. 
 73. See 6 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 26.8 n.6 (2014), available at LexisNex-
is CORBIN (noting that as of August 1, 2010, thirty-nine states had adopted 
the revised Article 1 of the U.C.C.; twenty-eight of those adopt the broader 
general definition of good faith). 
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faith and fair dealing involves the incorporation into law of 
“contractual morality,”
74
 opening up the potential for extensive 
judicial superintendence of contractual discretion. As scholars 
in a long tradition of work on the relational aspects of contract 
have shown, the morality of contracting—as perceived by the 
participants—pervasively demands cooperation, flexibility, and 
some degree of accommodation of the other party’s legitimate 
interests.
75
 Along similar lines, many courts have cited the 
Summers-Restatement reference to community standards of de-
cency, fairness, and reasonableness as an interpretation of the 
meaning of good faith and fair dealing.
76
 Others say that the 
duty prevents parties from frustrating the purpose of the con-
tract.
77
 Some courts have spoken of a “duty of cooperation.”
78
 
Still other courts say that the duty prevents a party from up-
setting the other party’s justified, reasonable, or legitimate ex-
pectations.
79
 Such expectations may arise from informal norms 
and implicit understandings between the parties, not just from 
the formal contractual documents.
80
 Enthusiasts for expansive 
views of the duty have endorsed it as a demand for acts of al-
truism toward one’s contractual partner,
81
 and as a require-
ment that one exercise one’s formal entitlements in a spirit of 
solidarity with the other party.
82
 Along similar lines, skeptics of 
broad conceptions of good faith have worried that the doctrine 
 
 74. Summers used this phrase in his 1968 article. Summers, supra note 
49, at 195, 214.  
 75. Roughly speaking, relational contract theory explores the implications 
of the insight that contracts are embedded within a broader set of relations 
between the parties, an idea that has been a source of inspiration both for law-
and-economics scholarship and for sociological scholarship on contracts. For an 
excellent recent overview of relational contract scholarship of both kinds, see 
Robert E. Scott, The Promise and Peril of Relational Contract Theory, in 
REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY 105 (Jean 
Braucher et al. eds., 2013). 
 76. E.g., Best v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 739 P.2d 554, 557 (Or. 1987). 
 77. E.g., Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal., Inc., 826 
P.2d 710, 728 (Cal. 1992). 
 78. E.g., Beidel v. Sideline Software, Inc., 811 N.W.2d 856, 864 (Wis. 
2013); In re Estate of Chayka, 176 N.W.2d 561, 564 n.7 (Wis. 1970).  
 79. E.g., Beraha v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 956 F.2d 1436, 1444 (7th 
Cir. 1992) (reasonable expectations); Carma Developers, 826 P.2d at 728 (legit-
imate expectations).  
 80. See Joseph Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1369, 1380–81 (2013). 
 81. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 
89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1721 (1976) (in its most altruistic form, good faith 
could include a “duty to absorb some loss in order to avoid a larger loss to one’s 
contractual partner”). 
 82. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 210 (1976). 
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requires judicial enforcement of the Golden Rule or of Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative;
83
 that it enshrines “commercial Good 
Samaritanism”;
84
 or even that the good faith and fair dealing 
duty imposes a regime of “commercial palimony.”
85
 
The duty of good faith and fair dealing has been invoked in 
several thousand cases, often successfully. And the duty has 
sometimes served as the basis for strikingly liberal impositions 
of liability. For example, in K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co.,
86
 the 
Sixth Circuit invigorated the field of “lender liability” by apply-
ing the duty to a bank’s decision to refuse further advances to a 
borrower in financial difficulties. Without giving any notice, the 
lender dishonored checks drawn by the borrower, and the bor-
rower’s business soon collapsed.
87
 Though the text of the par-
ties’ loan agreement seemed to place no limits on the lender’s 
discretion to grant or deny a request for further credit, the bor-
rower provided expert testimony stating that a reasonable 
lender would at least have given notice of the denial so as to 
give the borrower time to find alternative sources of financing.
88
 
Having been instructed to impose liability if it found the lender 
had acted unreasonably when it exercised its discretion to deny 
further credit, the jury found a violation of the implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, and awarded the borrower 
damages of $7.5 million.
89
 The Sixth Circuit upheld the ver-
dict.
90
 The court stressed that the borrower was at the lender’s 
mercy, and that the parties had a long-term banking relation-
ship.
91
 
 
 83. White, supra note 7, at 690–91.  
 84. See Gillette, supra note 6, at 635; see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The 
Duty To Rescue in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 647, 666–70 (2002) 
(contending, more enthusiastically than Gillette, that some instances of the 
duty of good faith performance exemplify a duty to rescue one’s contractual 
counterparty). 
 85. Douglas K. Newell, Will Kindness Kill Contract?, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
455, 471 (1995). 
 86. 757 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1985).  
 87. Id. at 754. 
 88. Id. at 759. 
 89. Id. at 755, 760. 
 90. Id. at 766. 
 91. As Steven Burton points out, the K.M.C. decision is an illustration of 
relational contract law (to which Burton himself is hostile). Steven J. Burton, 
Good Faith in Articles 1 and 2 of the U.C.C.: The Practice View, 35 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1533, 1554 (1994). 
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B. THE LIMITED ENFORCEMENT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR 
DEALING 
Despite the expansive implications of a duty to engage in 
commercially reasonable behavior, judicial enforcement prac-
tices have usually fallen short of what Llewellyn seemed to in-
tend.
 
It is admittedly difficult to provide a comprehensive ac-
count of the case law on good faith performance, because there 
is no generally accepted doctrinal framework, and many deci-
sions rely on judicial or jury intuition to distinguish between 
good faith and bad faith performance. Still, a large number of 
scholars reviewing the case law agree that the reality of en-
forcement has failed to match good faith’s definitional rheto-
ric.
92
 Courts often quickly undercut their own sweeping invoca-
tions of commercial reasonableness with statements that the 
task of implying terms based on the duty is a “cautious enter-
prise,”
93
 or that courts should not be “overly ambitious” when 
applying the duty.
94
 In addition, courts have developed myriad 
doctrinal tests to limit the duty’s enforcement. As I explain be-
low, courts often assess defendants’ conduct under deferential 
standards of review; they sometimes require plaintiffs to estab-
lish improper motive or near-dishonest conduct; they impose 
heightened burdens of proof on plaintiffs; and they sometimes 
allow pro-defendant norms to trump good faith and fair deal-
ing. 
1. Deferential Standards of Review 
One way that courts restrict the effectiveness of good faith 
and fair dealing is by providing that the reasonableness of a de-
fendant’s contractual performance should be reviewed under a 
deferential standard. Rather than decide for themselves what 
counts as bad faith or unreasonable behavior, courts explicitly 
allow the defendant some degree of latitude. For example, 
many courts state that, to ground a claim based on a defend-
ant’s exercise of discretion, the plaintiff must establish that the 
decision was “arbitrary” or “capricious.”
95
  
 
 92. For accounts stressing the divergence between the rhetoric and reality 
of enforcement in good faith and fair dealing cases, see Dubroff, supra note 20; 
Gillette, supra note 6; Houh, supra note 21; Imwinkelried, supra note 12. 
 93. Cincinnati SMSA Ltd. P’ship v. Cincinatti Bell Cellular Sys. Co., 708 
A.2d 989, 992 (Del. 1998).  
 94. Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 791 A.2d 1068, 1079 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2002). 
 95. See, e.g., Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp., 773 A.2d 1121, 1132 (N.J. 
2001). 
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In some cases, courts have applied standards of review 
closely equivalent to corporate law’s business judgment rule. In 
corporate law, the business judgment rule involves the pre-
sumption that the Board of Directors acted independently, with 
due care, in good faith, and in the honest belief that its actions 
were in the stockholders’ best interests.
96
 The rule shields di-
rectors and officers from liability for failure to take due care 
where the challenged decision can be attributed to any rational 
business purpose; effectively, the rule limits liability to extreme 
cases.
97
 A similar approach emerges from a review of franchise 
litigation under various statutory and common-law good faith 
duties. Though one court in California has found a contractual 
provision unconscionable on the ground that it superimposed 
the business judgment rule on the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing,
98
 many franchise cases have actually applied some-
thing very like the business judgment rule when reviewing 
franchisor discretion, even without a contractual provision to 
that effect.
99
 
Courts also constrain the good faith and fair dealing 
standard by superimposing doctrinal requirements in specified 
contexts to restrict the scope of a reasonableness test. The Su-
preme Court of Nevada’s decision in Davis v. Nevada National 
Bank,
100
 a lender liability case, provides an example. The de-
fendant bank granted the plaintiffs a loan to finance the con-
struction of their new home.
101
 Rather than simply advancing 
the money to the plaintiff, the bank reserved the power to dis-
burse the funds to the builder.
102
 As construction progressed, 
the plaintiffs noticed serious structural defects in the founda-
tion, and implored the bank to stop doling out their cash to the 
builder.
103
 Yet the bank continued to make advances, squander-
 
 96. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811–12 (Del. 1984).  
 97. Id. 
 98. Vlahos v. Int’l Baking Co., No. A102335, 2005 WL 1632089, at *8 (Cal. 
Ct. App. July 12, 2005). 
 99. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the 
Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 984–85 (1990) (many 
courts have applied something like a business judgment approach to adjudi-
cating good faith claims in franchise cases); Jeffrey C. Selman, Applying the 
Business Judgment Rule to the Franchise Relationship, 19 FRANCHISE L.J. 111 
(2000) (advocating explicit adoption of a business judgment rule by analogy to 
corporate law). 
 100. 737 P.2d 503 (Nev. 1987). 
 101. Id. at 504. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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ing the plaintiffs’ money on a fundamentally defective house.
104
 
The bank’s conduct was certainly commercially unreasonable, 
but that alone was not enough to ground a claim. While accept-
ing that the bank was under a duty of care,
105
 the court took 
pains to reject the idea of a general legally enforceable duty on 
the bank’s part to exercise care in the disbursement of the 
loan.
106
 It crafted more restrictive conditions for the duty to be 
applied by the jury, stating that “it would be unjust to permit a 
lender, with impunity, to simply disregard a borrower’s com-
plaint of substantial construction deficiencies affecting the 
structural integrity of a project.”
107
 A genuine attempt to impose 
a full-blooded standard of commercial reasonableness would 
not stop there. 
2. Requiring Proof of Bad Motive or Borderline Duplicity 
As we have seen, at the level of definitional rhetoric, the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be breached by ob-
jectively unreasonable conduct, regardless of the actor’s motive 
or mental state.
108
 But courts have nevertheless developed doc-
trinal tests that focus the inquiry on the defendant’s state of 
mind.
109
 Even where courts purport to apply an “objective” 
standard, they often require the plaintiff to establish an im-
proper motive or borderline dishonesty. In this way, courts fall 
short of what a true attempt to enforce a norm of commercial 
reasonableness would involve. 
Again, franchise cases provide examples of this process. 
Courts adjudicating challenges by franchisees to the discre-
tionary decisions of franchisors often impose a requirement of 
improper motive. In Wilson v. Amerada Hess Corp.,
110
 for ex-
ample, a gas station franchisee complained that the franchisor 
had exercised its discretion to raise prices so drastically that it 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 505. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id.; see also id. at 506. 
 108. E.g., Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Dev. Cal., Inc., 826 
P.2d 710, 727 (Cal. 1992) (“Dishonesty presupposes subjective immorality; the 
covenant of good faith can be breached for objectively unreasonable con-
duct . . . .”). 
 109. Sometimes statutory definitions of bad faith make clear that a de-
fendant will be liable only for specified forms of wrongdoing. For example, the 
Automobile Dealer’s Day in Court Act limits actionable conduct to “coercion, 
intimidation, or threats of coercion or intimidation from the other party.” 15 
U.S.C. § 1221(e); see also, e.g., Paccar Inc. v. Elliot Wilson Capitol Trucks LLC, 
905 F. Supp. 2d 675, 685 (D. Md. 2012). 
 110. 773 A.2d 1121 (N.J. 2001). 
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drove the franchisee out of business. The court ruled that the 
franchisee would only be entitled to damages under the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing if it could show that the franchisor 
had acted from a “bad motive.”
111
 The court remanded the case 
for further discovery on the issue of whether the franchisor had 
acted with the intention of putting the franchisee out of 
business—an allegation the court admitted would be “difficult 
to prove.”
112
  
Sometimes, courts demand proof of something very close to 
dishonesty when applying the supposedly “objective” standard 
of good faith and fair dealing. One particularly well-known ex-
ample is Judge Posner’s opinion in Market Street Associates v. 
Frey.
113
 The case involved a real estate sale and leaseback 
transaction, originally entered into for financing purposes 
between a retail tenant and a landlord in 1968.
114
 The lease 
entitled the tenant to ask the landlord to finance repairs to the 
property.
115
 The contract also stated that, if negotiations over 
financing the requested improvements failed, the tenant could 
repurchase the property at a price determined by a formula.
116
 
Almost twenty years later, a new tenant requested financing to 
build a new store.
117
 At this time, the contract’s price formula 
evidently offered the tenant a knock-down price for the proper-
ty.
118
 The landlord rejected the financing request out of hand, 
having forgotten the extreme consequences of a failure of 
negotiations.
119
 Seeking to avoid the automatic sale provision, 
the landlord invoked the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
120
  
Judge Posner applied a narrow conception of the duty’s 
requirements. He accepted that it would be inconsistent with 
good faith to “take deliberate advantage of an oversight by your 
contract partner concerning his rights under the contract.”
121
 
The dispositive question, on Judge Posner’s view, was “simply 
whether [the tenant] tried to trick [the landlord] and succeeded 
 
 111. Id. at 1130–31. 
 112. Id. at 1131.  
 113. 941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never 
Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1349, 1357, 1359–60 (2009).  
 114. Mkt. St. Assocs., 941 F.2d at 591. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 591–93. 
 121. Id. at 594. 
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in doing so.”
122
 As Todd Rakoff has shown,
123
 Judge Posner’s 
opinion does not explain convincingly why his “anti-trickery” 
reading of good faith and fair dealing is preferable to the 
District Court’s finding that the duty simply required the ten-
ant to notify the landlord of the contract’s terms as a precondi-
tion for seeking to invoke them. But Judge Posner’s view is in 
keeping with a series of other judicial opinions—including his 
own
124
—stating that good faith and fair dealing does not 
necessarily entail the judicial enforcement of commercial 
reasonableness, even though legislatures and courts often 
express the norm in those terms.  
3. Imposing Heightened Evidentiary Burdens 
Another way that courts discourage resort to the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing is by erecting evidentiary hurdles in 
front of plaintiffs who seek to invoke it. The most explicit ex-
ample comes from government contract litigation. The federal 
common law of government contracting recognizes the implied 
duty of good faith and fair dealing.
125
 But where a private con-
tractor claims a breach, courts apply a strong presumption that 
government officials acted in good faith.
126
 That presumption 
can be overcome only if the plaintiff provides “well-nigh irrefra-
gable proof,”
127
 or, in more modern language, “clear and con-
vincing evidence,”
128
 of bad faith. The application of this heavy 
presumption of good faith to the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing appears to be the product of historical confu-
sion.
129
 Nevertheless, it seems to have survived a recent judicial 
 
 122. Id. at 596. On remand, the District Court conducted a bench trial, and 
ruled that there was a breach of the duty of good faith even under Judge 
Posner’s restrictive standard. Mkt. St. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Frey, 817 F. Supp. 
784, 788 (E.D. Wis. 1993), aff’d 21 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 123. Todd D. Rakoff, Good Faith in Contract Performance: Market Street 
Associates v. Frey, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1187 (2007).  
 124. E.g., Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River Valley 
Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that reasonableness is 
not the test for good faith). 
 125. See, e.g., Centex Corp. v. United States, 395 F.3d 1283, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 126. See Bryan O. Ramos, Never Say Die: The Continued Existence of the 
Government Officials’ Good Faith Presumption in Federal Contracting Law 
and the Well-Nigh Irrefragable Proof Standard After Tecom, 63 A.F. L. REV. 
163 (2009). 
 127. Info. Tech. & Applications Corp. v. United States, 316 F.3d 1312, 1323 
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 128. Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234, 1239–
40 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 129. See Stuart B. Nibley & Jade Totman, Let the Government Contract: 
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attempt to confine it to cases where “a government official is 
accused of fraud or quasi-criminal wrongdoing in the exercise of 
his official duties,”
130
 and continues to apply to ordinary breach-
es of the implied covenant by the federal government.
131
 
A heightened evidentiary burden makes it particularly dif-
ficult to establish a breach of good faith when it is combined, as 
it often appears to be, with a requirement of proof of improper 
motive.
132
 Plaintiffs do sometimes prevail in government con-
tracting suits based on the implied covenant. In one recent 
case, the judge made a finding of bad faith, having reviewed in-
ternal communications among officials and concluded the 
plaintiff had proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that a 
number of Army officials had engaged in a “prolonged cam-
paign to harm” the plaintiff.
133
 But a plaintiff will generally 
need to engage in extensive and costly discovery to find the 
necessary degree of proof, and, as a result, many government 
contractors presumably decide not to file suit at all. 
4. Giving Precedence to Other Legal Norms 
The duty of good faith and fair dealing is supposedly im-
plied in every contract, giving rise to the potential for conflict 
with other implied contract law norms. In particular, the good 
faith norm conflicts with the general American rule of at-will 
employment, under which employment under an indefinite con-
tract of employment can be terminated for any reason,
134
 or for 
no reason at all. The dominant trend is to subordinate the doc-
trine of good faith and fair dealing in the field of employment 
terminations. 
It once appeared that the new contract law duty would 
take precedence over the at-will norm. In a series of decisions 
in the 1970s and 1980s,
135
 several courts applied the Summers-
 
The Sovereign Has the Right, and Good Reason, To Shed Its Sovereignty When 
It Contracts, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1 (2012). 
 130. Tecom, Inc. v. United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 736, 769 (2005). 
 131. See Road & Highway Builders, LLC v. United States, 702 F.3d 1365, 
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (rejecting argument that presumption of good faith 
should be limited to fraud or quasi-criminal wrongdoing); Nibley & Totman, 
supra note 129 at 24; Ramos, supra note 126, at 165–66. 
 132. See, e.g., Precision Pine & Timber, Inc. v. United States, 596 F.3d 817, 
829–30 (Fed. Cir. 2010); D’Andrea Bros. LLC v. United States, 96 Fed. Cl. 205, 
222 (2010). 
 133. N. Star Alaska Hous. Corp. v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 158 (2007). 
 134. Other than those reasons barred by antidiscrimination statutes.  
 135. E.g., Hoffman La-Roche v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725, 738 (Ala. 1987); 
K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Nev. 1987); Hall v. Farmers 
Ins. Exch. 713 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Okla. 1985); Mitford v. de Lasala, 666 P.2d 
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Restatement logic to employment terminations as an exception 
to the rule of at-will employment. The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court explicitly linked the emerging norm against bad 
faith termination of an at-will employment contract to the Re-
statement’s provision on good faith and fair dealing.
136
 The jury 
had held for the plaintiff based on a theory of bad faith termi-
nation, in a case where the employer had fired a salesman for 
the purpose of depriving him of bonuses to which he was about 
to become entitled.
137
 The court upheld the verdict even though 
the literal words of the contract gave the employer the power to 
terminate the contract without cause at any time.
138
  
But the tide has turned against the application of the good 
faith norm to terminations of indefinite employment arrange-
ments. Faced with a conflict of norms, the majority of states 
simply award victory to the at-will norm; they do not permit 
the implied covenant to operate.
139
 Courts rejecting the duty in 
the employment setting claim that the implied covenant is just 
too vague
140
 (a somewhat unconvincing contention, given that 
the covenant applies to every other contract), or find that it is 
simply incoherent to have a rule of at-will employment while 
simultaneously restricting that doctrine with a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing.
141
 In the at-will employment setting, 
then, even proof of bad-faith motive will generally not ground a 
claim for breach of contract. Even the states that originally rec-
ognized the application of the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing in this field have “circumscribed the covenant’s impact in 
what amount to expressions of judicial remorse.”
142
 The Su-
preme Court of California, for example, now says that, notwith-
standing the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, an at-will 
employer “may act peremptorily, arbitrarily, or inconsistently, 
without providing specific protections such as prior warning, 
 
1000, 1006–07 (Alaska 1983); Cleary v. Am. Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 
445 (Ct. App. 1980); Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 
(Mass. 1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974). 
 136. Fortune, 364 N.E.2d at 1257. 
 137. Id. at 1253. 
 138. Id. at 1258. 
 139. See James J. Brudney, Reluctance and Remorse: The Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing in American Employment Law, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & 
POL’Y J. 773, 773–74 (2011). 
 140. See Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Wis. 
1983) (describing the concept of bad faith as amorphous). 
 141. See Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc. 506 N.E.2d 919, 922 (N.Y. 1987) 
(explaining that implying a duty of good faith and fair dealing that restricts an 
employer’s right to terminate at will would be inconsistent). 
 142. Brudney, supra note 139, at 774.  
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fair procedures, objective evaluation, or preferential reassign-
ment.”
143
 
C. PROPOSALS TO CLOSE THE GAP BETWEEN RHETORIC AND 
REALITY  
Scholars seeking to make sense of this area of contract law 
have assumed that courts must bring the rhetoric of good faith 
into line with the reality of enforcement—or vice versa. Among 
those skeptical of broad judicial pronouncements, doubts about 
full-blooded enforcement of good faith and fair dealing find an 
intellectual foundation in the “neoformalist” trend in contracts 
scholarship.
144
 The duty of good faith and fair dealing was a 
product of the realist and contextualist reaction to classical 
formalism, so it is no surprise that it has come under fire from 
neoformalists both on the bench and in academia. Robert Scott, 
for example, contends that the cost of having courts discern 
commercial reasonableness exceeds any benefits it could bring 
to the parties.
145
 Lisa Bernstein, another critic of the U.C.C.’s 
strategy of incorporating commercial reasonableness, concludes 
that the idea of good faith plays only a very minor role in 
private arbitration systems chosen by commercial parties to 
adjudicate their own disputes.
146
  
The most obvious implication of these arguments is that 
courts should “level down” the rhetoric of good faith to reflect 
the limited reality of enforcement. In their strongest form, lev-
 
 143. Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1110 (Cal. 2000). 
 144. For overviews of contract law neoformalism, see David Charny, The 
New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842 (1999); William J. Wood-
ward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 971 
(2001).  
 145. See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1688 (2003) (arguing that “an attempt to enforce 
deliberately incomplete contracts by adopting a broad standard of reasonable-
ness or good faith is socially inefficient”). 
 146. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking 
the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 
1775–76 (1996) [hereinafter Bernstein, Merchant Law] (stating that arbitra-
tors for the National Grain and Feed Association never rely on a general duty 
of good faith, though conceding that the term “good faith” is used in some arbi-
tration decisions); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton In-
dustry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1734 (2001) (claiming that “notions of good faith and fair-
ness do not appear to affect case outcomes” under private arbitration in the 
cotton industry). Bernstein admits that notions of good faith and substantive 
fairness “may . . . influence the outcome of arbitration cases in ways that can-
not be detected by reading opinions.” Bernstein, Merchant Law, supra, at 1776 
n.37. 
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eling-down accounts argue that courts and legislatures should 
abandon the good faith and fair dealing norm.
147
 A slightly less 
direct way to level down the duty is to pay lip service to it, but 
to tie the contours of the duty to the literal words of the 
contract’s text. A basic starting point for the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing is that the contract’s written words do not 
provide an exhaustive guide to the contract’s terms.
148
 Yet 
Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, 
Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting states another view of good faith 
and fair dealing’s meaning.
149
 The case concerned an attempt to 
subordinate a lender’s claim in bankruptcy for inequitable 
conduct, based on conduct broadly similar to the conduct at 
issue in the Sixth Circuit’s K.M.C. decision discussed above.
150
 
Judge Easterbrook took the opportunity to disagree with 
K.M.C., stating that “[u]nless pacts are enforced according to 
their terms, the institution of contract, with all the advantages 
private negotiation and agreement brings, is jeopardized.”
151
 
Accordingly, he continued, parties must be allowed to enforce 
the terms of their agreement “to the letter, even to the great 
discomfort of their trading partners, without being mulcted for 
lack of ‘good faith.’”
152
 For Judge Easterbrook, the borrower had 
no hope of establishing bad faith, because the text of the 
contract afforded a discretion to the lender without explicitly 
limiting that discretion.
153
 Good faith, he said, cannot “block 
 
 147. See Dubroff, supra note 20 (concluding that fair contracts should “be 
enforced without the uncertainties that would be created by enabling a party 
disadvantaged by enforcement of the deal to claim bad faith as a defense”); 
Victor Goldberg, Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity Contracts: Reining in 
Good Faith, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 319 (2002) (contending that courts are ill-
equipped to police exercises of discretion in long-term contracts); Mark 
Snyderman, Comment, What’s So Good About Good Faith? The Good Faith 
Performance Obligation in Commercial Lending, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1335, 1338 
(1988) (arguing that imposing an obligation of good faith in the commercial 
lending context “upset[s] the reasonable expectations of the parties and signif-
icantly limit[s] the flexibility available to lenders and borrowers in furtherance 
of commercial transactions”). 
 148. See Dennis M. Patterson, A Fable from the Seventh Circuit: Frank 
Easterbrook on Good Faith, 76 IOWA L. REV. 503, 523 (1991) (explaining that 
under the U.C.C. “[t]he concept of agreement is not limited to the terms of the 
parties’ writing: it includes a variety of elements, all of which must be synthe-
sized” (footnote omitted)). 
 149. Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 
1351, 1357 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 150. See supra text accompanying notes 86–91. 
 151. Kham, 908 F.2d at 1357. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See id. (“Debtor and Bank signed a contract expressly allowing the 
Bank to cease making further advances. . . . The Bank exercised its contractu-
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[the] use of terms that actually appear in the contract.”
154
  
As Judge Antonin Scalia once explained, the upshot of a 
strongly textualist approach would be “virtually to read the 
doctrine of good faith . . . out of existence.”
155
 Though the 
textualist approach to good faith has not completely swept the 
board,
156
 it has had some effect on judicial decisions.
157
 In par-
ticular cases, the contract’s express language is said to preclude 
the plaintiff’s attempt to invoke the good faith and fair dealing 
norm.
158
 Even in jurisdictions that often give effect to the duty 
of good faith, strongly textualist statements appear 
spasmodically.
159
 Courts sometimes say that “[t]he implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is limited to assuring 
compliance with the express terms of the contract, and cannot 
be extended to create obligations not contemplated by the 
contract.”
160
 In a recent case decided under Pennsylvania law, a 
federal district court judge even refused to give any effect to an 
express covenant of good faith and fair dealing, requiring the 
plaintiff to establish a breach of some other express term.
161
 
 
al privilege after loaning Debtor $75,000; it made a clean break and did not 
demand improved terms. It had the right to do this for any reason satisfactory 
to itself.”). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145, 1153–54 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 156. For example, in July 2013, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided 
Beidel v. Sideline Software, Inc., 842 N.W.2d 240 (Wis. 2013). The majority 
decision permitted a claim based on the covenant to proceed, despite an ab-
sence of explicit textual warrant for the claimed duty. Id. at 257. The majority 
disapproved of approaches to interpretation that follow “the letter but not the 
spirit of an agreement.” Id. at 250. The dissent, with approving citations to 
Judge Easterbrook, complained that majority was overriding the contract’s 
express text. Id. at 262–64 (Gableman, J., dissenting). 
 157. See In re Facebook PPC Adver. Litig., 709 F. Supp. 2d 762, 770 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010) (finding that an express term of contract placing risk of improper 
actions by a third party on one of the contracting parties precluded a good 
faith and fair dealing claim seeking to reallocate that risk); Imwinkelried, su-
pra note 12, at 11–12; Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, 
and Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1223, 1223–24 (1999). 
 158. See Facebook, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 770. 
 159. See, e.g., Super Valu Stores, Inc. v. D-Mart Food Stores, Inc., 431 
N.W.2d 721, 726 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (“[W]here, as here, a contracting party 
complains of acts of the other party which are specifically authorized in their 
agreement, we do not see how there can be any breach of the covenant of good 
faith.”). 
 160. See, e.g., Pasadena Live, LLC v. City of Pasadena, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 233, 
237 (2004). 
 161. Sheinman Provisions, Inc. v. Nat’l Deli, LLC, No. 08-cv-453, 2008 WL 
2758029, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2008); see also Benchmark Group, Inc. v. 
Penn Tank Lines, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 2d 562, 584 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (extending the 
same error to a case based on the implied covenant).  
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Though subsequent courts applying the implied duty of good 
faith and fair dealing have explicitly rejected the court’s 
error,
162
 the fact that a federal judge could make such a mistake 
is a strong indication of the doctrine’s vulnerability to 
textualist claims. 
Relatedly, many courts recite the claim that the duty of 
good faith and fair dealing provides no “independent” or “sepa-
rate” cause of action.
163
 Sometimes, courts use this language to 
make the relatively uncontroversial point that a breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing generally provides a 
claim for breach of contract, not a tort claim.
164
 Similarly, courts 
have also used the same idea at the pleading stage to clarify 
that a suit based on good faith and fair dealing is a species of 
claim for breach of contract, not an alternative cause of ac-
tion.
165
 But for many courts, the “no independent cause of ac-
tion” line—like the textualist approach—has become a piece of 
boilerplate doctrine, to be deployed when rejecting claims that 
do not find judicial favor. 
An alternative reaction to the disparity between rhetoric 
and reality in good faith is to hold the rhetoric constant, while 
advocating an increase in enforcement activity to match that 
rhetoric. In commercial cases, this “leveling-up” strategy is ex-
emplified by Richard Speidel’s argument that courts should 
seek out and enforce implicit relational norms under the doc-
trine of good faith performance, using the doctrine to lend judi-
cial force to requirements that parties cooperate, share risks, 
 
 162. See, e.g., Kamco Indus. Sales, Inc. v. Lovejoy, Inc., 779 F. Supp. 2d 
416, 426 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 2011). 
 163. See, e.g., CapitalSource Fin. LLC v. Pittsfield Weaving Co., 571 F. 
Supp. 2d 668, 673 (D. Md. 2006); Bay Fireworks, Inc. v. Frenkel & Co., 359 F. 
Supp. 2d 257, 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). The Permanent Editorial Board added a 
similar statement to the commentary on the Code. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. 
FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB COMMENTARY ON THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE: COMMENTARY NO. 10 (SECTION 1-203) FINAL DRAFT 4 
(1994). 
 164. See, e.g., Bellemare v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 894 A.2d 335, 345–46 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (stating that a “claim brought pursuant to a contract, 
alleging a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, sounds 
in contract” and was therefore subject to the statute of limitations for breach 
of contract claims); Littlejohn v. Parrish, 839 N.E.2d 49, 54 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2005) (noting the “prevailing view” that “the good-faith-and-fair-dealing re-
quirement is part of the contract—not a separate tort claim”).  
 165. See, e.g., ICD Holdings S.A. v. Frankel, 976 F. Supp 234, 243–44 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that when conduct that allegedly violates the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is also the predicate for breach of an 
express contract provision, the breach of good faith claim will be dismissed as 
redundant). 
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and act in ways that preserve the parties’ relationship.
166
 An-
other “leveling-up” argument is to be found in Emily Houh’s 
contention that courts should ramp up their enforcement prac-
tices to bring them into line with an expansive vision of societal 
equality.
167
 Houh argues that the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing should be used to provide remedies to victims of uncon-
scious gender and racial subordination in the contracting pro-
cess, even where remedies under civil rights statutes are una-
vailable in such cases.
168
 Yet another version of the “leveling-
up” strategy is Chunlin Leonhard’s argument that courts 
should use the good faith and fair dealing doctrine to combat “a 
business culture of everyone for themselves.”
169
 Leonhard con-
tends that courts adjudicating claims under the doctrine should 
impose liability where a reasonable person would find the con-
duct unacceptable, and that courts should have the power to 
impose tort damages in the event of a breach of this negligence 
standard.
170
  
II.  UNDERENFORCED LEGAL NORMS   
Though in one sense their positions are diametrically op-
posed, advocates of the leveling-down and leveling-up strate-
gies share a common assumption. Both sides assume that the 
scope of the good faith and fair dealing norm is, or should be, 
coextensive with judicial enforcement of that norm. In this way, 
partisans on both sides are characteristic of contracts scholars 
more generally; the idea that a legal norm can be valid beyond 
the boundaries of judicial enforcement is unfamiliar in con-
tracts scholarship.
171
 But the idea has a respectable intellectual 
provenance in other legal fields, and finds support in writings 
on general jurisprudence. So, in this Part, I begin the process of 
defending my claim that good faith and fair dealing is an 
 
 166. See Speidel, supra note 21, at 796–77. 
 167. See Houh, supra note 21.  
 168. Id. at 1029. 
 169. Chunlin Leonhard, Subprime Mortgages and the Case for Broadening 
the Duty of Good Faith, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 621, 622 (2011). 
 170. Id. at 635–36. Leonhard also advocates the extension of good faith and 
fair dealing to the pre-contractual phase. Id. 
 171. See, e.g., Klass, supra note 22 (explaining that contract theorists view 
contract law as either conferring a power or imposing a duty). One possible 
exception to this generalization is an article by Emily Sherwin on remedies for 
breach of contract, which uses a somewhat similar idea to bridge the gap be-
tween the rhetoric of remedies for breach of contract and the reality of judicial 
enforcement. Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in Contract Enforcement, 50 
MD. L. REV. 253, 300–14 (1991) (the disparity between rights and remedies in 
contract law gives rise to “acoustic separation”).  
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underenforced legal norm by reaching outside the law of con-
tracts.  
The best-known discussion of divergences between legal 
norms and the rules for their enforcement in the American le-
gal literature is probably Meir Dan-Cohen’s article on criminal 
law.
172
 Dan-Cohen shows that we can understand legal rules as 
being addressed to two audiences: rules addressed to the gen-
eral public, and rules addressed to legal officials in their capac-
ity as legal officials.
173
 A law against theft, as Bentham long ago 
pointed out, can be understood as saying both “[l]et no man 
steal” and “[l]et the judge cause whoever is convicted of stealing 
to be hanged.”
174
 In Dan-Cohen’s terminology, the former is a 
“conduct rule” for citizens to follow; the latter is a “decision 
rule” for courts to apply.
175
 Typically, conduct rules and decision 
rules correspond in criminal law, in that courts follow a deci-
sion rule requiring them to impose sanctions in the event of any 
breach of a given conduct rule.  
But, Dan-Cohen shows, it is logically possible for gaps to 
open up between conduct rules and decision rules. So, in the 
hypothetical example on which Dan-Cohen focuses, criminal 
law might contain a conduct rule that intentional killing is for-
bidden, even in circumstances of necessity.
176
 Simultaneously, 
however, the law might contain a decision rule that shields a 
necessitous killer from conviction.
177
 In addition to exposing the 
logical possibility of divergence between conduct rules and deci-
sion rules, Dan-Cohen’s article explores the legitimacy of hiding 
such divergences from the general populace.
178
 But the distinc-
tion between conduct rules and decision rules is not itself prem-
ised on deception; divergences between conduct rules and deci-
sion rules might be openly acknowledged and communicated to 
citizens. Though Dan-Cohen does not use the term 
“underenforcement,” his necessity-as-a-defense-to-murder ex-
ample is an illustration of an underenforced conduct rule: the 
law defines as murder, and forbids, killing in necessitous cir-
cumstances, but no legal sanctions will attach to the violation 
 
 172. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 23.  
 173. Id. at 627. 
 174. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Leg-
islation, in A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 113, 430 (Wilfrid Harrison ed., 
1948) (emphasis omitted). 
 175. Dan-Cohen, supra note 23. 
 176. See id. at 637–39 (presenting the hypothetical necessity example). 
 177. See id. 
 178. Id. at 665–77. 
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of the rule where the judge or jury finds that the defendant act-
ed out of necessity.  
A. UNDERENFORCED NORMS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Though the conduct rule-decision rule distinction has been 
deployed fruitfully in criminal law,
179
 constitutional law is the 
site of the most elaborate scholarly work—so much so that 
there is an accepted genre of scholarship adopting a “constitu-
tional decision rules” model.
180
 Scholars adopting this model 
draw a distinction between, on the one hand, what the Consti-
tution requires or authorizes (i.e., conduct rules, referred to in 
the literature as “constitutional meaning” or “constitutional op-
erative propositions”
181
) and, on the other hand, judicial doc-
trines whose function is to implement those conduct rules (i.e., 
decision rules, or “implementing doctrines”).
182
 For the most 
part, the text of the Constitution leaves the task of devising de-
cision rules to the courts. Most constitutional adjudication does 
not involve interpretation of the constitutional text, so much as 
the development of “a substructure of substantive, procedural, 
and remedial rules drawing their inspiration and authority 
from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions.”
183
 
On this view, constitutional law doctrine implements, but does 
not always track, the norms set forth in the Constitution itself. 
Working in this vein, Richard Fallon has defended the “permis-
sible disparity thesis”—the claim that “a [justifiable] gap fre-
quently exists between constitutional meaning and judicially 
enforced doctrine.”
184
 Where constitutional conduct rules extend 
to a broader degree of circumstances than those reached by the 
corresponding decision rule, the effect is an underenforced con-
stitutional norm.
185
  
 
 179. See Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudica-
tion, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 730 (1990) (using a criminal law example to illus-
trate this distinction). 
 180. For an extensive review, see Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Deci-
sion Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1 (2004).  
 181. For reasons mostly specific to constitutional law, Mitchell Berman 
prefers the term “constitutional operative propositions” to “conduct rules.” Id. 
at 58–59 n.192. I will stick with “conduct rules” to preserve symmetry with the 
rest of the paper.  
 182. Id. at 57–58. 
 183. Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1975); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Imple-
menting the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 56, 57 (1997). 
 184. Fallon, supra note 26, 1278–79, 1317. 
 185. Outside the United States, one can find even clearer examples of un-
enforced constitutional duties. For example, the Irish Constitution requires 
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1. Underenforcement and Political Questions 
Let’s begin with the clearest example of judicial 
underenforcement of legal norms in American constitutional 
law, the political question doctrine.
186
 When a plaintiff brings 
an action seeking relief on the basis that the defendant’s action 
violated the Constitution, or that a legislative enactment under 
which the defendant acted is unconstitutional, the defendant 
may respond in several ways. Most straightforwardly, the de-
fendant can join the issue on the merits, and rebut the claim of 
unconstitutionality. But, alternatively, the defendant can re-
spond that the claim should be dismissed because it raises a 
nonjusticiable political question. When a court dismisses a con-
stitutional claim on the ground that it raises a nonjusticiable 
political question, the court does not say that the defendant has 
not violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Rather, the 
court simply declines to decide the issue.
187
 At least sometimes, 
then, courts must be rejecting valid constitutional claims.  
In political question cases, the reasons for declining to en-
force the Constitution to its fullest extent stem from the insti-
tutional features of courts. The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Vieth v. Jubilirer
188
 is a particularly clear illustration of the 
point. The plaintiffs complained that the defendants had en-
gaged in partisan gerrymandering in drawing electoral dis-
tricts, and claimed that the defendants’ conduct violated the 
Constitution. Writing for the plurality in Vieth, Justice Scalia 
assumed, for the sake of argument, that “an excessive injection 
of politics [into the redistricting process] is unlawful” under the 
Equal Protection Clause.
189
 He maintained nonetheless that the 
federal courts should not even try to adjudicate partisan ger-
rymandering claims. Legislatures, he said, can pass laws that 
are “inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc,” but, “law pronounced 
by the courts must be principled, rational, and based upon rea-
soned distinctions.”
190
 Accordingly, courts must develop “judi-
 
the legislature to apply “directive principles of social policy,” including socio-
economic rights, while explicitly providing that these principles “shall not be 
cognisable by any Court under any of the provisions of this Constitution.” IR. 
CONST., 1937, art. 45. Conversely, courts sometimes engage in 
“overenforcement,” by adopting prophylactic rules to protect constitutional 
rights. See Fallon, supra note 26, at 1303–06. 
 186. See Sager, supra note 32, at 1224–25; see also Fallon, supra note 26, 
1280–97.  
 187. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993). 
 188. See generally 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
 189. Id. at 293 (emphasis omitted). 
 190. Id. at 278. 
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cially discernible and manageable standards” for adjudicating 
claims.
191
 Justice Scalia reviewed various proposed doctrinal 
tests for partisan gerrymandering claims, and found that none 
provided sufficient guidance to courts to save them from confu-
sion and arbitrariness. Sometimes, and, for the majority of the 
Supreme Court, Vieth was one of those times, “the judicial de-
partment has no business entertaining the claim of unlawful-
ness—because the question is entrusted to one of the political 
branches or involves no judicially enforceable rights.”
192
 
Leaving aside the particular claim of nonjusticiability in 
Vieth, the case shows that the absence of judicially manageable 
standards sometimes leads to a gap between the constitutional 
conduct rule (in this case, the norm of equal protection) and the 
decision rules applied by courts. In at least some instances, 
constitutional underenforcement may well be justified, for pre-
cisely the kinds of institutional reasons the Supreme Court has 
offered in support of it. Broadly speaking, these reasons stem 
from concerns about the court’s limited expertise and its own 
lack of direct democratic legitimacy. In addition to a desire for 
judicially manageable standards, the Supreme Court has given 
the following reasons that may support a finding that a case 
raises a nonjusticiable political question: “a textually demon-
strable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political branch”; “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking in-
dependent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due 
coordinate branches of government”; “an unusual need for un-
questioning adherence to a political decision already made”; “or 
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one question.”
193
 None 
of these institutional reasons affects the validity of a constitu-
tional norm invoked by a plaintiff. Rather, each of these rea-
sons bears on the suitability of the judiciary determining 
whether or not the government actor has violated that norm.  
It is often meaningful to say that an action is unconstitu-
tional, even if no court will ever rule on the issue. Government 
officials should follow the Constitution whether or not their 
acts can be challenged in court.
 
For example, many recent ac-
tions by executive officials engaged in counterterrorism efforts 
will probably never be challenged in a court of law because of 
the political question doctrine, standing doctrines, and execu-
tive immunity doctrines (another significant source of judicial 
 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 277. 
 193. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
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underenforcement). But a claim of unconstitutionality has sig-
nificant resonance in the court of public opinion, and at least 
some officials consider themselves bound in conscience to act 
within the Constitution’s limits. For these reasons, officials 
take great pains to convince themselves and others—often im-
plausibly—that their actions are compliant with the Constitu-
tion and other binding sources of law, even where there is no 
prospect of judicially imposed sanctions.
194
  
2. Subtler Examples of Underenforcement: Doctrinal Tests 
The examples in the previous section provide relatively ob-
vious examples of constitutional conduct rules extending be-
yond the boundaries of judicial decision rules. But constitution-
al law doctrine contains many subtler, less openly 
acknowledged, forms of underenforcement. In constitutional ad-
judication, interpretation of the Constitution’s text is perva-
sively supplemented by doctrinal tests devised by the Supreme 
Court. These doctrinal tests supply precisely the kinds of judi-
cially manageable standards identified in the political question 
jurisprudence as a precondition of enforcement by the courts. 
Yet the very same standards often entail partial 
underenforcement of the conduct rules they implement.  
The most obvious kinds of doctrinal test that give rise to 
underenforcement are those explicitly mandating deference to 
other governmental institutions. For example, in due process 
challenges to disciplinary actions by prison authorities, courts 
will reject the claim so long as “some evidence” supports the 
disciplinary action.
195
 This doctrinal test means that, so long as 
the record contains some indication of justifiability, a prisoner 
who is innocent of the alleged misconduct, and whose punish-
ment was motivated by malice, has no judicially cognizable due 
process claim.
196
 Similarly, courts adopt a a principle of judicial 
deference to military regulations on the ground that judges are 
often ill-equipped to second-guess military decisions.
197
 Where 
courts defer to a legislative or executive actor’s determination 
in the course of assessing the constitutionality of its action, 
 
 194. See Frederick Schauer, Official Obedience and the Politics of Defining 
“Law” (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Paper Series, Re-
search Paper No. 2013-11, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2220923. 
 195. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Constitutional Requirement of “Some Evi-
dence”, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 631, 633 (1988) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 196. See Fallon, supra note 26 at 1299–300. 
 197. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64–65 (1981). 
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courts must, at least sometimes, be leaving actual constitution-
al violations unremedied.  
The example on which I will focus is perhaps the grandest 
constitutional norm: the Equal Protection Clause. While equal 
protection claims are sometimes completely excluded from a 
given field under the political question doctrine,
198
 they are 
more often subjected to more understated forms of 
underenforcement.
199
 The Clause provides simply that “no state 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”
200
 But equal protection litigation does 
not proceed simply by laying the government action side by side 
with the text of the Clause and checking for consistency. First, 
the Clause itself requires interpretation to discern its meaning. 
The Supreme Court has said that the Clause is “a direction 
that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”
201
 
The Clause may mean that a state may only treat persons dif-
ferently when it is fair to do so,
202
 or that the government may 
not classify individuals in ways not reasonably designed to 
promote a legitimate state interest,
203
 or that the government 
may not engage in discrimination that shows a lack of equal 
concern and respect for a particular group.
204
 No interpretation 
commands universal assent, and plausible interpretations of 
the Equal Protection Clause tend to be both highly demanding 
and vague.  
For these reasons, the Supreme Court has developed deci-
sion rules for equal protection cases. In the courts, advocacy is 
generally structured around that judicially created doctrinal 
framework. The Supreme Court’s main doctrinal tool in equal 
protection cases involves sorting measures into three different 
boxes: those deserving strict scrutiny, those deserving interme-
diate scrutiny, and those subject only to rational basis review. 
Racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, whereby the 
government is under a burden to establish that the action is 
narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.
205
 Clas-
 
 198. See generally, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 199. See Fallon, supra note 26, at 1297–98; Sager, supra note 32, at 1215–
20; see also Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 
MINN. L. REV. 311, 315–26 (1987).  
 200. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 201. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).  
 202. E.g., Sager, supra note 32, at 1215. 
 203. See Berman, supra note 180, at 9. 
 204. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Aspiration and Underenforcement, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (2006).  
 205. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
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sifications based on gender are subject to an intermediate form 
of scrutiny, under which the government must show a substan-
tial relationship to an important government interest.
206
 But 
heightened scrutiny of either kind is exceptional; most govern-
ment actions are subject only to rational basis review. Under 
rational basis review, government action is presumed to be con-
stitutional, and the party challenging the action will prevail on-
ly if she establishes that it bears no rational relationship to any 
legitimate governmental objective.
207
  
These tiers of review cannot seriously be defended as form-
ing part of the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.
208
 Ra-
ther, they are constitutional decision rules, justifiable (if at all) 
only by reference to the Supreme Court’s perception of its insti-
tutional competence and, relatedly, to the perceived need to de-
fer to legislative will for reasons of legitimacy. Starting with 
the assumption that racial classifications are especially unlike-
ly to be justified, the court applies strict scrutiny in such cases 
so that it can “‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race by assuring 
that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough to war-
rant use of a highly suspect tool.”
209
 The rational basis test, 
conversely, is a “‘salutary principle of judicial decision,’” among 
the “self-imposed restraints intended to protect [the Supreme 
Court] and the state against irresponsible exercise of [the Su-
preme Court’s] unappealable power.”
210
 All statutes discrimi-
nate among people, but the fairness of such classifications is 
best left primarily to the political process.
211
 In the vast array of 
 
551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007). 
 206. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (the justifica-
tion for a gender-based classification must be “exceedingly persuasive”); id. at 
559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“[A] gender-based classification must bear a 
close and substantial relationship to important governmental objectives.” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)).  
 207. See, e.g., Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2079–80 
(2012). 
 208. See Fallon, supra note 26, at 1297–98 (“None of these tests tracks the 
language of the Equal Protection Clause, nor has the Supreme Court attempt-
ed to link them to the original historical understanding.”); Berman, supra note 
180, at 82 (noting that it is “hard to imagine that the strict scrutiny test con-
stitutes any part of the original meaning of the Equal Protection Clause”).  
 209. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).  
 210. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 247 (1970) (the rational basis test in 
equal protection cases is “a limitation stemming, not from the Fourteenth 
Amendment itself, but from the nature of judicial review”). 
 211. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982); cf. JOHN HART ELY, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 105 (1980) 
(“[R]ights like [those in the First Amendment], whether or not they are explic-
itly mentioned, must nonetheless be protected, strenuously so, because they 
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cases subject only to rational basis review, the constitutional 
norm of equal protection—whatever it means—is substantially 
underenforced in the courts.
212
  
Another important feature of equal protection litigation is 
its focus on governmental purpose or motive.
213
 Sometimes, the 
Supreme Court’s focus on the government actor’s motive favors 
plaintiffs. Even in cases formally governed by rational basis re-
view, the Supreme Court has sometimes struck down measures 
because they were motivated by animus toward an unpopular 
group. This form of review began in United States Department 
of Agriculture v. Moreno,
214
 a challenge to Congress’s decision to 
deny food stamps to individuals who lived in households with 
other unmarried adults to whom they were not related. Though 
a rational basis could surely be found for Congress’s action, the 
Supreme Court concluded that the measure was aimed at dis-
criminating against hippies, and, on that basis, found a viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause.
215
 Subsequent decisions 
have held unconstitutional measures motivated by animus to-
ward undocumented children,
216
 people with mental disabili-
ties,
217
 and gay people.
218
 
More often, however, the Supreme Court’s focus on motive 
redounds to the government’s benefit. To invoke heightened 
scrutiny, the judicially enforced version of the Equal Protection 
Clause requires the plaintiff challenging a facially neutral 
measure to establish that an official decisionmaker was moti-
vated by a discriminatory purpose.
219
 In suits brought pursuant 
to the Fourteenth Amendment, a disparate impact, no matter 
how disproportionate, foreseeable, and unfair, will not suffice to 
sustain the suit (though it may provide evidence of the required 
discriminatory purpose). The Equal Protection Clause itself 
says nothing about motive; states can treat people unfairly 
without acting with a discriminatory motive. If the Supreme 
 
are critical to the functioning of an open and effective democratic process.”). 
 212. See Ross, supra note 199, at 315 (“Through sparing use of heightened 
scrutiny and extensive application of the deferential rational basis test, the 
Court has adopted a policy of underenforcing equal protection issues.”). 
 213. On purpose tests in constitutional law more generally, see Fallon, su-
pra note 183, at 71–73, 90–94.  
 214. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
 215. Id. at 534–38. 
 216. See generally Plyler, 457 U.S. 202. 
 217. See generally City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 
(1985). 
 218. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 219. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).  
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Court’s requirement of purpose is to be justified, then, it must 
be supported by pragmatic reasons. In Washington v. Davis, 
Justice White offered just such a reason. He claimed that a rule 
requiring a compelling justification for legislative measures 
that have a racially disparate impact would be “far reaching” 
and would call into question a whole range of tax, welfare, pub-
lic service, and licensing statutes.
220
 Here, as elsewhere in con-
stitutional law, a purpose test provides a minimal protection 
against unconstitutional conduct, but its reach falls short of to-
tal enforcement.
221
 The Court left Congress to decide whether 
and when judges should engage in strict scrutiny of measures 
having a racially disparate impact. 
Indeed, the Constitution explicitly confers on Congress a 
power to create decision rules for equal protection cases,
222
 il-
lustrating the proposition that constitutional law is not just 
what the judges say it is. With its distinct institutional capaci-
ties and sources of legitimacy, Congress is—at least some-
times
223
—able to supply remedies where the Court has declined 
to act. Moreover, regardless of judicially or congressionally 
mandated enforcement, the equal protection norm is valid as a 
conduct rule binding other government actors. Legislators and 
other government officials remain independently bound to 
comply with equal protection, and should not limit their consti-
tutional calculations to asking if judicial doctrine would spell 
victory in litigation.  
To be clear, I do not seek to defend the particular forms of 
underenforcement chosen by the Supreme Court. But, for the 
purposes of illuminating the law of contracts by analogy, I 
 
 220. Id. at 248.  
 221. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 
VA. L. REV. 1043, 1081 (2010) (“When important constitutional values are at 
stake, and it is difficult for the Supreme Court to agree on an alternative test 
of constitutional validity to protect those values, purpose tests provide a min-
imal protection against abuses of governmental power.”).  
 222. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power 
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
 223. In a long line of cases beginning in the mid-1990s, the Supreme Court 
has jealously guarded its prerogative to determine the scope of constitutional 
rights, and has struck down several congressional attempts to expand access 
to judicial remedies under the Equal Protection Clause and other elements of 
the Reconstruction Amendments. See, e.g., Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 
2612, 2629–31 (2013) (invalidating the Voting Rights Act’s requirement that 
changes to state voting laws undergo federal “preclearance” review to ensure 
that such changes are not racially discriminatory); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. 
v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 
536 (1997). But even on the Court’s view of the scope of the enforcement pow-
er, Congress has some power to design appropriate decision rules for courts.  
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adopt the following aspects of the constitutional law literature: 
the analytical distinction between conduct rules and decision 
rules; the descriptive claim that the Supreme Court has often 
chosen the path of underenforcement in constitutional cases; 
and the relatively weak normative claim that perfect judicial 
enforcement of demanding, open-ended constitutional norms, 
even if attainable, is undesirable. 
B. UNDERENFORCEMENT IN CORPORATE LAW 
A similar phenomenon is at work in corporate law. Though 
it appears that no one has explicitly made the link with the 
constitutional law literature, a body of scholarship shows that 
the law of directors’ and officers’ duties also consists of partially 
underenforced legal norms. About twenty years ago, Melvin Ei-
senberg pointed to a gap between what courts say directors and 
officers must do (“standards of conduct”) and the doctrines that 
courts apply when enforcing these duties (“standards of re-
view”).
224
 Eisenberg contended that “the standards of review in 
corporate law pervasively diverge from the standards of con-
duct.”
225
 The idea has even been incorporated into the ABA’s 
Model Business Corporation Act.
226
 
Directors and officers, for example, are subject to a duty of 
care in the management of the corporation. When explaining 
the duty of care, courts say that a director or officer must take 
the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be 
expected to take in the circumstances.
227
 This standard, as Ei-
senberg says, is “fairly demanding.”
228
 Nevertheless, directors 
and officers will often escape legal liability for many breaches 
of the duty of care. That is because, when they come to court, 
claims for breach of the duty of care are frequently adjudicated 
under deferential standards such as the business judgment 
rule.
229
 To surmount the business judgment rule, it is not 
enough to show that the defendant’s decision or action was un-
reasonable; the plaintiff must show that the defendant is guilty 
of subjective bad faith, or that the decision was irrational.
230
 It 
 
 224. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 30. 
 225. Id. at 438.  
 226. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30–.31 (2011). 
 227. See 1 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) cmt. to § 4.01(a), para. 1 (1994). 
 228. Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 440. 
 229. Some claims for breach of the duty of care are adjudicated not under 
the business judgment rule but under some other limited decision rule, such 
as a gross negligence test. See id. at 447–49. 
 230. See id. at 439–43. 
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is much easier for directors and officers to escape liability un-
der rationality review than it would be under reasonableness 
review. The business judgment rule “preserves a minimum and 
necessary degree of director and officer accountability,” but it is 
“considerably less demanding than the relevant standard of 
conduct, which is based on reasonableness.”
231
 
Similarly, according to judicial statements of corporate 
law’s duty of loyalty, directors and officers must act fairly in 
matters involving their self-interest.
232
 The standard of conduct 
requires both that the terms of the transaction into which the 
corporation enters must be fair, and also that those terms were 
the result of a fair process.
233
 Where a disinterested Board of 
Directors has not approved the transaction in question, the ju-
dicial standard of review hews quite closely to the standard of 
conduct. But where a disinterested Board has approved the 
transaction, courts apply less searching standards of review, 
asking only, for example, whether disinterested directors could 
reasonably have believed that the transaction was fair.
234
 Ei-
senberg explains that this standard of review accommodates, 
on the one hand, “the need to make self-interested transactions 
reviewable for fairness,” and, on the other hand, “the value of 
institutional autonomy and the desirability of providing self-
interested directors and officers with an incentive to seek early 
approval from disinterested directors.”
235
 
As constitutional law scholars have done, Eisenberg explic-
itly links his contrast between standards of conduct and stand-
ards of review in corporate law to Dan-Cohen’s conduct rule-
decision rule distinction.
236
 Like Dan-Cohen, Eisenberg rejects 
the reductionist claim that the law consists solely of decision 
rules. He affirms the independent significance of standards of 
conduct in corporate law as messages to directors and officers 
about how they ought to discharge their functions.
237
 In a recent 
 
 231. Id. at 443 (emphasis omitted). 
 232. Interestingly, Eisenberg concludes that corporate law’s narrow duty of 
good faith is not an underenforced norm. Id. at 449. It appears that, even as a 
standard of conduct, the duty of good faith in corporate law requires knowing-
ly wrongful conduct. Id. To put the point another way, corporate law’s duty of 
good faith is not a duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
 233. See id. at 450. 
 234. See id. at 453–54. 
 235. Id. at 454. 
 236. See supra text accompanying note 172. 
 237. For criticism of this claim, and of the divergence thesis in corporate 
law more generally, see Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care 
and Business Judgment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1152 (2013). 
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article building on Eisenberg’s insights, Julian Velasco follows 
Eisenberg in noting that, as a result of the divergence between 
standards of conduct and standards of review, corporate law’s 
standards of conduct are only “imperfectly enforced,” or, using 
the very same word as constitutional law scholars, 
“underenforced.”
238
 Standards of review are sensibly more leni-
ent than standards of conduct, so as to leave directors and of-
ficers some room for maneuver, and to leave courts some room 
for error.
239
 Velasco is particularly concerned to characterize 
corporate law’s standards of conduct as genuine duties, against 
claims that, to the extent they go beyond judicial standards of 
review, corporate law’s standards of conduct are merely aspira-
tional. For Velasco, as for Eisenberg, it still makes sense to 
speak of a legal duty in the absence of a sanction. Corporate 
law’s functions include providing guidance for those directors 
who wish to obey the law, regardless of whether they will face 
liability for violating their duties.  
The structure of this claim is similar to the constitutional 
decision rules scholars’ understanding of equal protection doc-
trine. Indeed, scholars of corporate law might fruitfully pursue 
the analogy between the underenforcement of directors’ and of-
ficers’ duties and underenforced constitutional norms. I will 
note just a couple of significant parallels. As in constitutional 
law, the existence of some alternative enforcement mechanism 
for inducing compliance with the conduct rule helps to build a 
case for the wisdom of underenforcement by courts. In corpo-
rate law, the relevant alternative mechanisms are provided 
mainly by corporate governance structures. Corporate officers 
are accountable to the Board of Directors; the Board, in turn, is 
mainly accountable to shareholders through means other than 
litigation. In the event of conduct that falls short of reasonable 
care or fairness in the conduct of self-interested transactions, 
shareholders can seek a more active role in corporate decision 
making (the mechanism of “voice”) or sell their stock (the 
mechanism of “exit”).
240
 These governance mechanisms will 
generally be more effective than litigation, and at lower cost. 
 
 238. Velasco, supra note 31, at 524, 580. 
 239. See id. at 525, 550–51. 
 240. The terminology of “exit” and “voice” derives from ALBERT O. 
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). Hirschman focused more on responses by 
customers to decline in firms, but his typology has often been applied to corpo-
rate law. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV & Bradley C. Faris, Second-Generation 
Shareholder Bylaws: Post-Quickturn Alternatives, 56 BUS. LAW. 1323, 1323–28 
(2001). 
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But, of course, corporate governance mechanisms are far from 
perfect, and corporate law does not completely forswear judicial 
enforcement of directors’ duties. Its standards of review may 
perhaps be too deferential, but the courts are not entirely tooth-
less. At the very least, courts maintain a useful role in identify-
ing, and applying legal sanctions to, the worst breaches of the 
duties of care and loyalty. In addition, the debate over whether 
the unenforced portions of corporate law duties are “merely as-
pirational” is paralleled by a debate in constitutional law over 
whether some of the Constitution’s most demanding norms 
should be viewed as partly aspirational.
241
 
III.  GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING AS AN 
UNDERENFORCED LEGAL NORM   
In this Part, I pursue the analogy between the 
constitutional law of equal protection, corporate law’s duties of 
care and loyalty, and the contracts norm of good faith and fair 
dealing. By this stage, certain elements of the analogy should 
be fairly obvious. All of these norms are stated at a high level of 
generality, and all are subject to contestation about their very 
meaning and their proper application to the facts of individual 
cases. As a result, many commentators and judges have voiced 
doubts about the institutional capacity of courts to handle such 
broad norms. Crucially, in all three areas, the courts have 
declined to enforce these norms to their fullest extent. 
Moreover, underenforcement may be justified in each case 
because of the availability of alternative institutions for giving 
effect to the norm. In the law of equal protection, the most 
common alternative mechanism for defining and enforcing a 
norm is the political process.
242
 In corporate law, shareholder 
activism and markets provide other ways of inducing compli-
ance with legal duties.
243
 In contracts, as I will explain below, 
the most obvious alternative mechanisms to give effect to good 
faith and fair dealing are self-help measures and reputational 
sanctions. But, as in constitutional and corporate law, the 
existence of alternative mechanisms has not meant that courts 
simply refrain from giving any effect to the norm of good faith 
and fair dealing. In all three areas, the courts have attempted 
 
 241. Richard Fallon suggests that some constitutional rights should be 
viewed as partly aspirational from the point of view of any actor. See Fallon, 
supra note 26, at 1324–27. But see Roosevelt, supra note 204, at 197 (express-
ing discomfort with this aspect of Fallon’s argument). 
 242. See Part II.A.2. 
 243. See Part II.B. 
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to devise judicially manageable standards, and, moreover, have 
often reached for doctrinal solutions focusing on the defendant’s 
motivations. 
A. GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING: THE CONDUCT RULE 
I propose that we take the rhetoric of good faith and fair 
dealing seriously—as a statement of the conduct rule that 
binds the parties to a contract. To that extent, the law of most 
states adopts Llewellyn’s vision of a legal norm requiring com-
mercial reasonableness; in the words of the Restatement, good 
faith and fair dealing demands compliance with “community 
standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.”
244
 As a con-
duct norm, good faith and fair dealing is analogous to the norm 
of equal protection—it is an abstract principle of fairness in 
contract performance and enforcement.
 
Just as the equal pro-
tection norm prevents government actors from classifying peo-
ple unfairly, so the basic conduct norm of good faith and fair 
dealing prohibits unreasonable exercises of contractual discre-
tion.
245
  
Reasonableness in contract performance frequently ex-
tends beyond what the contract’s written terms seem to permit 
or require. Moreover, reasonableness demands more of con-
tracting parties than avoiding spiteful behavior and borderline 
dishonesty. In the words of a business person interviewed by 
Stewart Macaulay for his famed study of contractual behavior: 
“[y]ou don’t read legalistic contract clauses at each other if you 
ever want to do business. One doesn’t run to lawyers if he 
wants to stay in business because one must behave decently.”
246
 
Reasonableness in contractual conduct very often requires the 
parties to share losses and benefits unforeseen at the time of 
the initial contract.
 
Particularly in contracts of longer duration, 
the parties are bound by social norms of reasonableness to ad-
just the terms of exchange to meet with new circumstances.
247
 
 
 244. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981). 
 245. Conceivably, good faith and fair dealing really stands for two norms: a 
norm of honesty and a norm of reasonableness. See Thomas A. Diamond & 
Howard Foss, Proposed Standards for Evaluating When the Covenant of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated: A Framework for Resolving the 
Mystery, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 585, 600–01 (1996). At a higher level of abstraction, 
however, the honesty norm might be folded into the reasonableness norm: rea-
sonableness requires honesty.  
 246. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Prelimi-
nary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 61 (1963) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
 247. See Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An 
Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1, 6–7 (1987). 
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Ian Macneil’s work on relational contract theory similarly iden-
tifies norms of contractual solidarity, reciprocity, cooperation, 
and flexibility in the performance of contracts.
248
 While 
Macneil’s work is associated with an ex post perspective, broad-
ly similar understandings of what reasonableness in contractu-
al behavior involves have been derived from an ex ante per-
spective. Robert Scott, for example, defends a general norm of 
mutual cooperation in relational contracts, contending that ra-
tionally self-interested actors seek to share risks by agreeing, 
explicitly or implicitly, to cooperate with their contractual 
counterparties when new contingencies arise.
249
  
The conduct rule of good faith and fair dealing in contract 
performance is certainly open-ended. It is, however, a mistake 
to leap from the truism that good faith and fair dealing is vague 
to the claim that it “has no general meaning or meanings of its 
own.”
250
 As the editors of Corbin on Contracts explain, “[g]ood 
faith is a vague and shifting concept, but so is justice. That a 
concept cannot be formalized into a tight matrix does not make 
it wrong.”
251
 For more specific guidance as to what counts as 
reasonable behavior in a particular class of cases, we might 
look to the particular social norms actually prevailing in a giv-
en industry.
252
 These prevailing norms provide significant, 
though non-conclusive, evidence of what counts as good faith 
and fair dealing.
253
 The task of discerning the demands of rea-
sonableness in particular circumstances is admittedly a chal-
 
 248. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO 
MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS 1–35 (1980); Ian R. Macneil, Values in 
Contract: Internal and External, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 341, 346–66 (1983). 
 249. Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial 
Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597, 604 (1990). As I note in Part III.B, Scott’s 
approach differs from mine in that he considers the implied norm of mutual 
cooperation to be non-legal. 
 250. Summers, supra note 49, at 196. But see Patterson, supra note 61 
(criticizing Summers’s “excluder” analysis on the ground that it “fails to sepa-
rate the need for clarification of a fuzzy concept from concepts that are totally 
parasitic on other notions”). 
 251. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 73, § 26.8. 
 252. For a powerful attack on the idea that one can discern the content of 
good faith performance from prevailing practices, see generally Alan D. Miller 
& Ronen Perry, Good Faith Performance, 98 IOWA L. REV. 689 (2013). Courts 
do not seem to have leaned heavily on specific trade usages when adjudicating 
good faith cases.  
 253. See Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn and the Origins of Contract Theory, 
in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL 
LAW 12, 16–17, 20–22 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) (arguing 
that, at least early in his career, Llewellyn saw commercial norms as evidence 
of appropriate behavior, not as constituting the standard of proper behavior).  
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lenging one for an outsider to undertake. 
B. UNDERENFORCEMENT, THE LIMITATIONS OF COURTS, AND 
ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF ENFORCEMENT 
The courts have spared themselves the task of articulating 
a fully specified account of good faith and fair dealing. As the 
discussion in Part I.B makes clear, the courts do not even try to 
enforce the norm of good faith and fair dealing to its conceptual 
limits—whatever the norm’s precise meaning may be. Judicial 
practice makes clear that good faith and fair dealing “is not an 
enforceable legal duty” to behave in accordance with commer-
cial decency toward one’s contractual counterparty.
254
 Many 
scholars have seen this divergence between rhetoric and reality 
as a simple form of hypocrisy. But with analogous examples 
from constitutional and corporate law in mind, it should be eas-
ier to see now that pro-defendant judicial decisions do not nec-
essarily mean that good faith and fair dealing is not valid as a 
conduct rule to its fullest extent.  
Just as courts lack the necessary legitimacy and expertise 
to discern the precise metes and bounds of equal protection and 
of duties in corporate law, so do they labor under analogous 
limitations when it comes to discerning fair exercises of con-
tractual discretion. As neoformalist contracts scholars have 
stressed, it is both challenging and expensive for courts to 
figure out what counts as fair behavior between contracting 
parties.
255
 The point is not that the courts are completely 
unable to give content to vague standards. Indeed, the idea of 
good faith and fair dealing is no more uncertain than many of 
the legal standards that judges and juries are required to 
apply. The tort of negligence, for example, often requires courts 
to determine what a reasonable person would have done in the 
circumstances, and eliminates or reduces a damage award 
when the plaintiff’s own unreasonable conduct contributed to 
her injury.
256
  
The question, rather, is one of relative competence. As in 
the constitutional law of equal protection, where most claims of 
classificatory unfairness are left by the courts to the political 
branches, it is the existence of alternative, often superior ways 
 
 254. Zick v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 623 F. Supp. 927, 929 (N.D. Ill. 
1985) (emphasis added). 
 255. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 145 (contending that the costs of having 
courts discern commercial reasonableness exceed any benefits it could bring to 
parties). 
 256. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 127, 218 (2d ed. 2011). 
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of dealing with unreasonable exercises of contractual discretion 
that makes underenforcement of the good faith norm a 
plausible strategy. Unreasonable behavior by contracting 
parties is usually checked by self-help by the victim, who may 
refuse to deal with the other party in future, and by 
reputational sanctions.
257
 Compared with these mechanisms, 
litigation is both expensive and in more severe danger of 
error.
258
 Litigation requires lawyers and judges. These outsiders 
require payment for their time, and they must also contend 
with informational deficits about the parties’ relationship be-
fore they can participate usefully in adjudication of the 
dispute.
259
  
On the other hand, when self-help and reputational 
sanctions break down—as they sometimes do when the parties’ 
relationship is at an end—litigation may come into its own in 
the limited class of cases where courts are fairly sure they can 
identify a misuse of contractual discretion. The 
underenforcement thesis thus fits with Eric Posner’s claim—
meant to apply more generally to contract law—that “a court, 
with its superior sanctions but inferior information, could do an 
adequate job of identifying extreme cases of opportunism but 
not minor cases of opportunism.”
260
  
Along these lines, one court has summed up its limited 
ambitions when developing good faith doctrine: “Without 
attempting to give positive content to the phrase ‘good faith,’ it 
is possible to set forth operational standards by which good 
faith can be distinguished from bad faith within a particular 
context.”
261
 Much of the material in Part I.B of this Article can 
fruitfully be understood in this way. Thus, a decision rule that 
requires plaintiffs to prove that the defendant acted from an 
improper motive does not exhaust the full scope of the 
requirement of good faith and fair dealing. But courts might 
sensibly choose a decision rule that limits liability to cases 
where the plaintiff can establish such an improper motive.
262
 Or 
 
 257. See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 
104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 392–93 (1990). 
 258. See id. at 426–27. 
 259. See id. at 427. 
 260. ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 63 (2000). 
 261. Best v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Oregon, 739 P.2d 554, 558 (Or. 1987). 
 262. See Henry E. Smith, The Equitable Dimension of Contract, 45 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 897, 907 (2012) (“[C]ourts should not aid one who is en-
forcing a promise out of spite . . . . Where someone is enforcing a right out of 
motivation to harm someone else, it is likely that something other than serv-
ing contractual purposes or welfare maximization is going on.”). 
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courts might choose to review the reasonableness of the 
defendant’s decision under a deferential standard of review, 
reserving liability for truly arbitrary or unreasoned decisions. 
Again, they might impose a heightened burden of proof on 
plaintiffs to ease the burden on the courts and to channel the 
parties toward self-help and reputational sanctions. In crafting 
decision rules for good faith and fair dealing cases, courts have 
done all of these things and more.
263
 
Though my claim that good faith and fair dealing is an 
underenforced legal norm is novel, it does not come entirely out 
of the blue. Clayton Gillette, whose article was among the 
earliest to identify the disparity between the rhetoric of good 
faith and its enforcement, hints at something like the 
underenforcement thesis when he says that, though 
“enforcement of an expansive notion of good faith appears to 
present overwhelming difficulties,”
264
 a more expansive good 
faith obligation might have a “precatory use.”
265
 But, by way of 
contrast to my views, Gillette characterizes compliance with a 
more expansive vision of good faith as “a supererogatory act” 
rather than as a matter of duty.
266
 Moreover, Gillette adopts the 
assumption that legal duty depends for its existence on 
remedial enforcement by the courts,
267
 seemingly leaving no 
conceptual space for the enforcement gap between legal conduct 
rules and judicial decision rules. Again, somewhat similar ideas 
can also be found in the neoformalist scholarship of Robert 
Scott, who argues that the parties to relational contracts 
operate under two “sets of rules”: a literalistic set of rules for 
legal enforcement, and “a more flexible set of rules for social 
enforcement.”
268
 I agree with Scott that two sets of rules are at 
play. Scott, however, characterizes the more flexible set of rules 
as “extralegal norms.”
269
 My interpretation of good faith and 
fair dealing as an underenforced legal norm allows for the pos-
sibility of legally recognized relational norms, even if judges re-
frain from full enforcement of those norms.  
C. WHY ENGAGE IN DELIBERATE UNDERENFORCEMENT?  
Admittedly, it would be a fool’s errand to try to establish 
 
 263. See Part I.B.1–3. 
 264. Gillette, supra note 6, at 665.  
 265. Id. at 664. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. at 620–23. 
 268. Scott, supra note 249, at 615. 
 269. Id. 
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that good faith and fair dealing is at present an underenforced 
legal norm in every jurisdiction in the United States; the case 
law is much too varied to admit only of a single interpretation. 
I offer one possible way of understanding judicial practice, but 
it is not the only conceivable way of doing so. Why should we 
choose this understanding of the doctrine as a basis for its fu-
ture development, as I suggest in Part IV? Why, indeed, should 
legislatures or courts ever announce norms that they do not in-
tend to be fully enforced? After all, in this context, and in oth-
ers, there are some strong reasons against deliberately setting 
up a system of underenforcement. For one thing, disparities be-
tween conduct rules and decision rules can be misleading, or at 
least mentally taxing—it is difficult enough to keep one set of 
rules straight, without having to understand two. In corporate 
law, for example, some commentators have contended that di-
vergences between conduct rules and enforcement rules are 
confusing, and have called for an alignment between standards 
of conduct and standards of review.
270
  
One deflationary way to think about underenforcement is 
to see it as a regrettable glitch in the lawmaking process: the 
result of a disagreement between different sources of lawmak-
ing authority. In constitutional law, for example, one might say 
that underenforcement results from a judicial desire to depart 
from what the Constitution itself provides. If the judges could 
go back and rewrite the Constitution to make its conduct rules 
less demanding (i.e., level them down), they would. But judges 
cannot amend the Constitution—they are stuck with it. 
Underenforcement, on this view, is just the next best thing to 
leveling down. One could tell a similar story about good faith 
under the U.C.C. Having been handed what they consider an 
overexpansive understanding of the parties’ conduct rules but 
being unable to rewrite the Code themselves—this story might 
go—judges have effectively amended the good faith provision by 
engaging in underenforcement.  
The story, however, must be different at least when a given 
field is governed purely by common law. In common-law fields, 
courts generally could align their conduct rules and decision 
rules if they wished. If courts are unconstrained by another 
source of binding authority (constitutional or statutory), why 
 
 270. See, e.g., Gregory Scott Crespi, Standards of Conduct and Standards 
of Review in Corporate Law: The Need for Closer Alignment, 82 NEB. L. REV. 
671, 673 (2004) (“[R]egardless of the particular criterion used, a single, clearly 
articulated standard is preferable to the current conflation of legal standards 
with moral exhortations.”). 
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would they want to say they are adopting a norm, yet leave it 
partially unenforced? The general doctrine of good faith and 
fair dealing thus provides a particularly pure testing ground for 
ideas about the justifiability of underenforcement. In turn, if a 
case can be made for deliberate underenforcement in the ab-
sence of split authority, that case may also apply to cases 
where authority is in fact divided. 
One possible line of reasoning for deliberately choosing the 
path of underenforcement in good faith and fair dealing might 
be based on Dan-Cohen’s idea of acoustic separation. According 
to Dan-Cohen, a legal system might sometimes be justified in 
announcing its (more demanding) conduct rules to the public, 
while obscuring its (less demanding) decision rules from public 
view.
271
 By engaging in selective transmission of its norms, the 
law can gain maximal compliance with its directives, while 
sometimes avoiding the negative consequences of punish-
ment.
272
 Selective transmission relies for its effectiveness on 
some degree of deception; for some critics, that is enough rea-
son to reject it outright.
273
 And whatever its merits in criminal 
law, where Dan-Cohen suggested it might be justified, selective 
transmission seems a particularly dubious proposition in pri-
vate law.
274
 One extra difficulty with engaging in this form of 
deception in private law is that private law relations are bilat-
eral. It is one thing to mislead the subject of a criminal law du-
ty into thinking she will face sanctions, only to show mercy in 
the event of an actual violation. But it is quite another thing to 
mislead the beneficiary of a duty into believing she has an en-
forceable claim, only to pull the rug out from underneath her 
after she suffers a breach. Moreover, in many private law are-
as, selective transmission is difficult to achieve. In corporate 
law, for example, it is surely impossible to hide decision rules 
from directors and officers.
275
 Worse still, because corporate in-
siders are especially likely to know what really happens when 
disputes get to court, the attempt to engage in selective trans-
mission of legal norms may create an added source of share-
 
 271. See Dan-Cohen, supra note 23, at 630. 
 272. See id. at 667–77. 
 273. Richard Singer, On Classism and Dissonance in the Criminal Law: A 
Reply to Professor Meir Dan-Cohen, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 69, 84–100 
(1986). 
 274. But see Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reci-
procity, and Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551, 634–35 nn.339–42 
(1999) (applying Dan-Cohen’s acoustic separation idea to wills law). 
 275. See Velasco, supra note 31, at 541–44 (rejecting acoustic separation in 
corporate law context on normative and descriptive grounds). 
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holder ignorance for insiders to exploit. Similarly, selective 
transmission is unlikely to be effective in good faith and fair 
dealing cases. If anything, uncommunicated divergences be-
tween conduct rules and decision rules in good faith and fair 
dealing are likely to provide an unfair advantage to repeat 
players
276
—franchisors, for example—whose discretion the good 
faith and fair dealing norm is aimed at constraining. 
So when courts design and apply decision rules that di-
verge from conduct rules, at least in the field of good faith and 
fair dealing, they should generally do so openly. But candor in 
underenforcement does not necessarily mean that the unen-
forced portions of conduct rules will be ineffective. To view the 
effect of law solely in terms of its enforcement is to miss a great 
deal.
277
 The law affects people’s behavior by providing them 
with standards of behavior for use in their practical reason-
ing.
278
 People obey legal standards in part because they are the 
law.
279
 In addition, people follow legal standards in part because 
they fear they will suffer reputational sanctions when others 
learn that they have broken the law.
280
 Neither of these mecha-
nisms for affecting behavior is vitiated by the absence of a per-
fectly corresponding decision rule. Moreover, private law’s 
guidance function is best achieved through relatively simple, 
easy-to-understand rules.
281
 Though open-ended, the courts’ 
general statements about the duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing are much easier to digest than the patchwork of decision 
rules they have developed for adjudication. 
Having gloried in private law’s guidance function for the 
last couple of paragraphs, I should inject an appropriate note of 
skepticism about it in the specific case of good faith and fair 
dealing. In truth, it is far from clear how much the unenforced 
portion of the duty might make a direct difference to the behav-
ior of actual contracting parties. Empirical studies suggest that 
even the enforceable parts of contract law play only a minor 
 
 276. Cf. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculation on 
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98–100 (1974) (describing 
the advantages of repeat players in playing the litigation game). 
 277. See John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 
125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1656 (2012) (“[T]he law’s authority resides as much in 
its ability to articulate recognizable norms of conduct as in the state’s en-
forcement power.”). 
 278. For an illuminating discussion of the law’s guidance function, with a 
private law focus, see generally Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforce-
ment Rules: A Better View of the Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REV. 837 (1997). 
 279. See id. at 885. 
 280. See Charny, supra note 257, at 393. 
 281. See Eisenberg, supra note 30, at 464–65. 
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role in commercial dealings,
282
 giving special reason to doubt 
the idea that, to the extent they are unenforced, judicial and 
legislative exhortations to act fairly have a great deal of effect. 
As I have suggested, the underenforced portion of the good 
faith and fair dealing norm is enforced by nonjudicial sanctions. 
But the requirement that one treat one’s contractual counter-
party reasonably would be a social norm even without the law’s 
intervention. The law’s symbolic support for the social norm 
may make a marginal difference—but is that marginal differ-
ence enough to justify the potential confusion caused by an en-
forcement gap? 
Perhaps not. But, in the case of good faith and fair dealing 
and elsewhere, there is an additional reason to announce a 
broad, partly underenforced conduct rule: to influence judicial 
behavior. This may appear a paradoxical thought. Conduct 
rules, after all, are directed at citizens; decision rules are di-
rected at courts.
283
 But, when formulating decision rules, judges 
are supposed to take much of their inspiration from the conduct 
rule they seek to implement.
284
 The duty of good faith and fair 
dealing sets a baseline of reasonable behavior,
285
 even if it only 
finds partial expression in judicial decision rules. It reminds 
judges that contracting is not supposed to be a game of poker, 
and that their role—though constrained by pragmatic limita-
tions—is to support healthier norms than those envisaged by a 
literal approach to contractual behavior. In turn, a broad con-
duct rule can be used to put parties on notice that they risk lia-
bility if they act in an opportunistic or excessively self-
regarding manner.
286
 Courts should thus not be too concerned 
about occasionally expanding decision rules to bring them clos-
er to the conduct rule’s demands, even with retroactive effect 
on the defendant before the court. Such a policy would help in-
duce defendants at least to think twice before aiming to place 
their conduct in the gap between the law’s conduct rules and its 
 
 282. Macaulay, supra note 246, at 62.  
 283. Dan-Cohen, supra note 23, at 630. 
 284. See id. at 628–29. 
 285. See Jack M. Beermann & Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions 
in Legal Reasoning: The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 GA. L. REV. 911, 942–
45 (1989). 
 286. See Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity 15–
30 (Mar. 10, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Harvard Universi-
ty), available at http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic619738.files/Paper_ 
08_03-22_Smith.pdf. Smith contends that preventing opportunism is a unify-
ing function for equitable doctrines. Id. at 3. Though the doctrine of good faith 
and fair dealing grew up after the fusion of law and equity, it has strong equi-
table overtones. See id. at 35. 
2100 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:2051 
 
decision rules.
287
 
D. AN OBJECTION: THE MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF DIVERGENCES 
At this point, scholars versed in recent debates over con-
tract law’s moral foundations may sense a potential roadblock. 
The idea of underenforced legal norms in contract law might be 
thought vulnerable to the arguments in Seana Shiffrin’s intri-
cate and thought-provoking critique of the law of contract as it 
currently stands.
288
 While Shiffrin rejects the simple idea that 
the law should aim to enforce interpersonal morality as such, 
she makes the plausible claim that the law should be compati-
ble with the conditions necessary for moral agency to flourish.
289
 
From this perspective, Shiffrin contends that divergences be-
tween promissory morality and the law of contract—
particularly the weakness of remedies available for breach of 
contract—may contribute to a culture of wrongful promise-
breaking.
290
 While Shiffrin does not mention the doctrine of 
good faith and fair dealing, we might surmise that its 
underenforcement would draw her ire.
291
 As a matter of promis-
sory morality, the arguments for a robust norm of good faith 
and fair dealing seem firm. To the extent that the 
underenforcement thesis suggests permissible caution about 
the legalization of that norm, the law seems to diverge from 
promissory morality.  
Contra Shiffrin, however, the best way to support and 
maintain good moral character in contractual situations may 
often be to allow divergences to open up between promissory 
morality and the law of contract, or at least between promisso-
 
 287. See Kennedy, supra note 81, at 1773–74; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, 
Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 1214, 1219–29 (2010). 
 288. See generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract 
and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007) (arguing that the law should ac-
commodate the needs of moral agency). 
 289. See id. at 709. 
 290. Id. at 740–49. 
 291. Indeed, one of Shiffrin’s critics, Steven Feldman, cites the existence of 
the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing as part of his argument against the 
existence of a divergence between contract law and promissory morality. Ste-
ven W. Feldman, Autonomy and Accountability in the Law of Contracts: A Re-
sponse to Professor Shiffrin, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 177, 194–96 (2009). Feldman 
claims that good faith and fair dealing is a “wide-ranging code of moral con-
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ment.” Id. at 196. Feldman’s descriptive claim is not terribly far off being an 
accurate depiction of the rhetoric of good faith and fair dealing, but—as Part 
I.B shows—it does not match the reality of enforcement. 
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ry morality and judicial decision rules in the law of contract. If 
courts were to attempt to occupy the full moral field, they 
might do more harm than good. Again, the analogy to constitu-
tional law helps to make the point more vivid. There, the 
underenforcement thesis helps to make clear that an action can 
violate the Constitution even though no court will provide a 
remedy for the violation, allowing space for legislators and citi-
zens to make their own constitutional judgments.
292
 James 
Bradley Thayer famously relied on the value of such independ-
ent judgments when arguing that courts should apply a “clear 
error” test when reviewing the constitutionality of legislation.
293
 
Thayer contended that, if the courts seek to occupy the field, 
the political branches of government will tend to abdicate their 
own responsibility for interpreting the Constitution, leading to 
unfortunate setbacks to constitutional values.
294
 Similarly, a 
body of judicial enforcement practices that tried to enforce 
promissory morality would risk “crowding out” the operation of 
trust and social norms by means of excessive juridification.
295
 
The courts’ inevitably clumsy attempts to enforce the morality 
of good faith in full might backfire on moral as well as economic 
grounds, hindering people’s ability to develop valuable relation-
ships of interpersonal trust.
296
  
But Shiffrin’s underlying premises, particularly when com-
bined with Thayer’s argument, do reinforce my earlier conclu-
sion that courts should be open and clear that their decisions to 
impose liability for good faith and fair dealing do not occupy the 
full field. Candor in underenforcement should go some of the 
way to addressing Shiffrin’s concerns, for it helps to avoid the 
implication that a decision to reject the plaintiff’s claim for in-
stitutional reasons necessarily entails approval of the defend-
ant’s conduct.
297
 Hence, when dismissing claims, courts should 
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be cautious about stating that a particular party’s conduct was 
in good faith and complied with reasonable standards of fair 
dealing. In closer cases, courts should take pains to say instead 
that the plaintiff failed to establish the requirements of deci-
sion rules.  
To some extent, judicial opinions already do something 
similar. Take, as an example, the First Circuit’s decision in a 
recent case, Young v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
298
 The court was 
asked by a mortgage debtor to apply the Massachusetts law of 
good faith and fair dealing to a creditor’s conduct.
299
 The court 
rejected the claim because the complaint failed to satisfy the 
doctrinal rubric laid down by Massachusetts courts: it did not 
establish that the bank had acted with an improper purpose.
300
 
Nevertheless, the First Circuit’s opinion stated that the bank’s 
“dilatory and careless conduct [was] troubling,” found it “prob-
lematic” that the bank had refused to give the debtor clear an-
swers about the parties’ relative legal obligations until she 
hired a lawyer, and noted that the complaint painted a picture 
of an “unthinking and sloppy” institution.
301
 None of these re-
marks was strictly necessary for the court’s decision to dismiss 
the good faith and fair dealing claim.
302
 But they do help to 
make clear that the enforcement of good faith falls short of 
what the conduct rule requires. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS   
The underenforcement thesis both illuminates existing 
judicial practice and points the way to a more intelligible and 
defensible body of good faith and fair dealing doctrine. While I 
do not offer a full elaboration of how the doctrine should look, I 
explore four ways that viewing good faith and fair dealing as an 
underenforced norm would be helpful to courts and scholars 
seeking to develop the law. 
 
pression from the court’s decision to reject a claim of good faith and fair deal-
ing. For a stimulating discussion of some analogous problems in the law, see 
generally Bert I. Huang, Shallow Signals, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2227, 2229 
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usually forbidden, copycat misconduct may be erroneously inspired by the 
false appearance that ‘others are doing it too.’”).  
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A. LEVELS OF SCRUTINY IN GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
Perhaps the most useful analogy between equal protection 
and good faith is that the degree of underenforcement of these 
norms rightly varies with context. There is no a priori reason 
why the choice of decision rule should be made at the wholesale 
level. In different contexts, the relative strengths of judicial 
enforcement and alternative mechanisms for inducing 
compliance with good faith and fair dealing will wax and wane. 
A single doctrinal test has the merit of simplicity, but a one-
size-fits-all approach is unlikely to be optimal. And existing 
doctrine shows some signs of contextual differentiation, though 
it is difficult to discern consistent patterns.  
As a matter of current practice, many exercises of 
contractual discretion get fairly light scrutiny under the 
doctrine of good faith and fair dealing, akin to rational basis 
review in constitutional law.
303
 Usually, if a defendant so much 
as offers a legitimate reason for her decision, she will escape 
liability.
304
 And in many cases, a deferential approach to 
exercises of contractual discretion may make sense. For exam-
ple, the courts of Delaware have been especially reluctant to 
use good faith and fair dealing to augment the text of preferred 
stock contracts.
305
 Such contracts are typically the result of ne-
gotiations by sophisticated and well-advised parties. In this 
kind of case, at least, the courts may rightly feel more comfort-
able with the notion that the parties should be responsible for 
identifying constraints on contractual discretion ex ante, rather 
than relying on costly and difficult ex post determinations of 
fair dealing by courts.
306
 As in constitutional law, the availabil-
ity of an—admittedly imperfect—institutional alternative helps 
to justify judicial deference.  
 This line of thought suggests two questions for scholars of 
good faith and fair dealing: first, what classes of cases are ripe 
 
 303. See supra note 207 and accompanying text. 
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for heightened scrutiny, in the way that race and gender-based 
classifications are singled out for special treatment among 
equal protection claims? And, second, what sort of heightened 
scrutiny should courts give to claims singled out in this way? 
Again, existing judicial practice offers some hints; sometimes 
courts in good faith cases apply doctrinal tests with real teeth. 
For example, in construing some state-law franchise statutes, 
courts apply a pro-plaintiff test in which the burden falls on the 
franchisor to explain and justify a termination decision.
307
 The 
structural inequalities that characterize many franchise 
relationships may well justify a more searching judicial role 
because alternative mechanisms for controlling franchisor 
discretion are less likely to be effective than in cases involving 
two roughly equal commercial parties. Another class of claims 
that might deserve—and may even be getting—heightened 
scrutiny are claims against subprime consumer mortgage 
creditors.
308
 On the other hand, the near-total absence of scruti-
ny for employment terminations is difficult to understand in 
these terms.
309
 If anything, such decisions seem particularly 
worthy of heightened scrutiny.  
These varying forms of treatment rarely receive official 
acknowledgement in judicial doctrine. In the interests of clarity 
and consistency, courts would likely benefit from borrowing the 
idea of differing levels of scrutiny from constitutional law and 
applying it explicitly to good faith and fair dealing claims. To be 
sure, the claim that the norm is underenforced provides only a 
framework for analysis rather than a full set of answers. But 
focusing attention on the right questions, and moving towards 
a manageable and accessible body of doctrine, would be major 
steps forward. 
B. TOTAL EXCLUSION OF GOOD FAITH V. LIMITED DECISION 
RULE 
The idea of good faith and fair dealing as an underenforced 
legal norm can also help to illuminate the choice between, on 
 
 307. See Am. Mart Corp. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 824 F.2d 733, 734 
(9th Cir. 1987). This test certainly falls short of the constitutional law test for 
strict scrutiny; I have found no court requiring a defendant in a good faith case 
to establish a compelling interest for her exercise of discretion.  
 308. See Leonhard, supra note 169, at 651–52; see also Joseph William 
Singer, Subprime: Why a Free and Democratic Society Needs Law, 47 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 167 (2012) (discussing the need for laws to ensure par-
ties can bargain “from a position of safety and security,” especially in response 
to the subprime mortgage crisis).  
 309. See supra text accompanying notes 140–43. 
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one hand, refusing to enforce good faith entirely and, on the 
other hand, giving some limited effect to the norm via a deci-
sion rule. Courts often face an analogous question in constitu-
tional law: faced with institutional reasons counseling against 
judicial enforcement of a particular norm in a given context, 
should they decline to operate in that field entirely (pursuant to 
the political question doctrine)? Or should they design a test 
that gives some effect to the constitutional norm? Richard Fal-
lon argues convincingly that the burden of persuasion should 
fall on those who advocate complete judicial abstention as op-
posed to the development of some sort of manageable stand-
ard.
310
  
Certainly, total exclusion of the implied norm of good faith 
and fair dealing might well be justified in the right 
circumstances. The law of interstate compacts provides a 
potential illustration, at an interesting intersection between 
public law and private law. Agreements between and among 
the States must be approved by Congress,
311
 and disputes 
arising from them come before the Supreme Court under its 
original jurisdiction.
312
 The Court treats interstate compacts as 
contracts, and generally interprets them in line with general 
principles of contract interpretation.
313
 Nevertheless, in 2010, 
the Supreme Court ruled that states are not subject to implied 
duties of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of an 
interstate compact.
314
 The court ruled that North Carolina’s 
explicitly stated power to withdraw from a compact could not 
be subjected to review for its fairness in the way that a private 
party’s exercise of discretion might.
315
 In explaining this 
decision for the Court, Justice Scalia stressed institutional 
factors: federalism and separation-of-powers concerns 
counseled against a rule that would permit the Supreme Court 
to supplement the express terms to which political branches of 
state and federal governments have agreed.
316
 Moreover, the 
 
 310. See Fallon, supra note 26, at 1306–09 (“Viewed along a spectrum, a 
determination of nonjusticiability due to the absence of judicially manageable 
standards is simply the limiting case of a decision to underenforce constitu-
tional norms.”).  
 311. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. 
 312. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
 313. See, e.g., Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 133 S. Ct. 2120, 2130 
(2013) (“Interstate compacts are construed as contracts under the principles of 
contract law.”).  
 314. Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S. 330, 351–52 (2010). 
 315. Id. at 352. 
 316. Id. 
2106 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:2051 
 
context in which interstate compacts are drafted and ratified 
suggests that these compacts are more likely than ordinary 
contracts to be considered complete at the time of drafting.
317
 
But in other areas, such as at-will employment, some 
courts seem to have moved too soon to the conclusion that good 
faith and fair dealing has no role to play.
318
 More generally, 
when one considers the wide range of potential decision rules 
from which courts can choose in implementing the good faith 
and fair dealing norm, the neoformalist critique of the general 
duty of good faith seems to be an overreaction. While Bern-
stein, Scott, and others may have been right to criticize Llewel-
lyn’s attempts to incorporate commercial morality in its entire-
ty into commercial law, the neoformalist critique has 
considerably less bite on a doctrine of good faith that is 
underenforced via the operation of constrained, judicially man-
ageable standards.
319
 
C. SHOULD THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING BE 
EXCLUDABLE? 
Distinguishing between good faith and fair dealing as a 
conduct rule and good faith as a set of judicial decision rules al-
so sheds some light on a doctrinal conundrum: should parties 
be able to contract out of the norm of good faith and fair deal-
ing? Existing law suggests that the obligation of good faith is 
not just a default rule, but an immutable rule.
320
 The general 
duty of good faith under the U.C.C. cannot be disclaimed by 
 
 317. As Justice Scalia noted, the drafters of several interstate compacts for 
the disposal of radioactive waste have explicitly chosen to incorporate duties of 
good faith into those agreements. Id. at 353 (citing Omnibus Low-Level Radio-
active Waste Interstate Compact Consent Act, Pub. L. No. 99-240, §§ 222, 224, 
225, 99 Stat. 1859, 1865, 1886, 1897 (1986) (referring to the Central Interstate 
Low–Level Radioactive Waste Compact, Central Midwest Interstate Low–
Level Radioactive Waste Compact, and the Midwest Interstate Low–Level Ra-
dioactive Waste Management Compact)). 
 318. See supra Part I.B.4; supra note 17. 
 319. Stewart Macaulay makes a similar point when responding to Bern-
stein’s work. Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating on a Sea of 
Custom? Thoughts About the Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NW. 
U. L. REV. 775, 787–88 (2000). If, as Bernstein suggests, there are often rea-
sons to doubt the existence of trade usages, why isn’t it sufficient to meet this 
concern to craft a decision rule whereby the party seeking to rely on a trade 
usage bears the burden of establishing it? 
 320. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: 
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) (noting that 
“under the Uniform Commercial Code . . . the duty to act in good faith is an 
immutable part of any contract”). 
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agreement.
321
 Admittedly, the Code quickly qualifies the immu-
tability of good faith, noting that parties can define the stand-
ards for judging good faith, so long as their chosen standards 
are not “manifestly unreasonable.”
322
 Similarly, though there is 
little case law on whether parties can contract around the gen-
eral common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing, some 
courts have said that attempts to do so will be ineffective.
323
 In 
the words of the New York Court of Appeals, “[n]o covenant of 
immunity can be drawn that will protect a person who acts in 
bad faith, because . . . the courts will not enforce it.”
324
  
Supporting the immutability of good faith, some writers 
have claimed that it must be either self-contradictory
325
 or 
fraudulent
326
 to enter into a contract while denying one’s obliga-
tion to perform in good faith. But these arguments become sub-
stantially less powerful when one allows for the possibility of a 
divergence between conduct rules and decision rules. It need 
not be self-contradictory or fraudulent for a party to wish to ex-
clude judicial enforcement of good faith and fair dealing. Com-
mercial parties, in particular, might rationally and fairly decide 
that the risk of error and litigation costs that would accompany 
legal enforceability are not worth the benefits that judicial en-
forcement would bring. Thus, there seems to be little reason for 
a complete ban on excluding a good-faith-based judicial decision 
rule by means of an explicit contractual provision. In this re-
spect, the U.C.C.’s rule that the duty of good faith is partially 
immutable is somewhat difficult to justify. On the other hand, 
for familiar reasons, the courts should often be suspicious of at-
tempts to exclude the duty of good faith and fair dealing by 
clickwrap and other standard-form consumer contracts, and 
should limit the duty’s displacement to genuine cases of agreed 
exclusion.  
D. ARBITRATION DECISIONS ON GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
In constitutional law, the underenforcement literature 
suggests that political actors lacking the institutional limita-
tions of courts should take a more expansive view of constitu-
 
 321. U.C.C. § 1-302(b) (2013). 
 322. Id. 
 323. STEVEN J. BURTON & ERIC G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH: 
FORMATION, PERFORMANCE, BREACH, ENFORCEMENT 72–74 (1995). 
 324. Indus. & Gen. Trust v. Tod, 73 N.E. 7, 9 (1905).  
 325. Markovits, supra note 35, at 284. 
 326. See BURTON & ANDERSEN, supra note 323, at 74. 
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tional rights and duties.
327
 Applying this insight to contract law, 
comparative institutional considerations suggest that arbitra-
tors are in a position to impose more demanding duties of good 
faith and fair dealing. More than courts, which tend to be 
staffed by generalist judges and juries who lack expertise, arbi-
trators are often in a better position to identify unreasonable 
contractual behavior, and at a lower cost.
328
 Other things being 
equal, the case for gaps between conduct rules and decision 
rules is lessened, and such gaps should be smaller. 
Though the available evidence is equivocal,
329
 the applica-
tion of the good faith norm in collective bargaining does seem to 
provide one example of arbitrators giving fuller effect to the 
good faith norm than their judicial counterparts. As we have 
seen, the majority of American states refuse to apply the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing to employment 
termination cases.
330
 But labor arbitrators adjudicating collec-
tive bargaining disputes have been willing to give serious force 
to the covenant.
331
 The covenant is well established as a matter 
of arbitral jurisprudence, and has, for example, been applied to 
disputes over employers’ decisions to sub-contract work in ar-
guable violation of the spirit of a labor agreement.
332
 In the ab-
sence of a contrary contractual provision, management must 
demonstrate that its decision to sub-contract—and thus to 
avoid the collective bargaining agreement’s employment provi-
sions—was “made in good faith and [is] objectively reasona-
ble.”
333
 In labor arbitration, the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing “serves as the basis for the proposition that manage-
ment discretion must be exercised reasonably.”
334
 The degree of 
underenforcement is further reduced by decisions that place 
 
 327. See supra Parts II.A.1–2. 
 328. See Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic 
Analysis, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5–6 (1995) (reasoning that arbitrators may be 
in a better position than courts to detect substandard contractual perfor-
mance). 
 329. As against the example in the text, Lisa Bernstein contends that some 
industry-specific private arbitration bodies apply a “formalistic” approach, 
seemingly hostile to enforcement of a good faith norm. See supra note 146.  
 330. See supra Part I.B.4. 
 331. Brudney, supra note 139, at 806–07. 
 332. Id. at 807. 
 333. See In re Libbey Glass, Inc., 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 182, 186–87 
(2000) (Ruben, Arb.) (finding no violation of the covenant as a result of an em-
ployer’s decision to sub-contract because of cost considerations).  
 334. Sierra Chem. Co., 121 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1593, 1595–96 (2005) 
(Pool, Arb.) (finding a violation of the covenant resulting from employer’s fail-
ure to consider relevant evidence during an employee grievance proceeding).  
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the burden of satisfying this doctrinal test on the manage-
ment.
335
 
Perhaps this greater arbitral willingness to enforce the 
covenant of good faith against employers is just a result of the 
dynamics of labor negotiations, but my analysis suggests other 
reasons why it might make sense. Labor arbitrators have a 
greater degree of expertise in the subject of labor disputes, and 
are presumably less prone to the kinds of errors made by gen-
eralist courts, which are more likely to fail to understand the 
parties’ employment relationship. Moreover, these considera-
tions have obvious implications for judicial review of arbitra-
tion decisions. Of course, courts already have general reasons 
to defer to the decisions of arbitrators—but those reasons are 
particularly strong in the good faith and fair dealing field. 
  CONCLUSION   
My purpose in this Article has been to establish that good 
faith and fair dealing can helpfully be understood as an 
underenforced legal norm. But the status of underenforced le-
gal norms is—to use a word from the constitutional law litera-
ture—a larger metadoctrinal issue.
336
 The phenomenon of 
underenforcement appears to exist elsewhere in private law. 
Most fundamentally, the idea of an enforcement gap between 
legal duties and available sanctions helps to make sense of how 
the courts talk about remedies in contracts, torts, and property 
cases. In particular, the notion of underenforced legal norms 
provides a line of response to Holmes’s aphorism that there is 
no duty at common law to keep one’s contracts—only a duty to 
pay damages.
337
 Once we have abandoned the assumption that 
being vulnerable to judicial sanction is the essence of legal du-
ty, we can see why courts speak of legal duties to keep con-
tracts even where specific performance is not available, and of 
rights to exclude others from property even where a court will 
not award an injunction. 
It is no coincidence that constitutional law scholarship 
helps the analysis.
338
 For various reasons, similar metadoctrinal 
 
 335. See Libbey Glass, 116 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) at 186–87. But see In re 
United Technologies Auto., 108 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 769, 772–73 
(1997) (Richard, Arb.) (applying a good faith balancing test). 
 336. See Berman, supra note 180, at 4. 
 337. O. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). 
 338. In the last few years, the trend has mostly been in the opposite direc-
tion; scholars have more often drawn ideas from private law into debates 
about public law. See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Reme-
dial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 859–60, 931 (1999) (contending 
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questions have received more attention from scholars in consti-
tutional law in recent years than have analogous questions in 
private law. For some time, much interesting and original work 
in private law eschewed the internal perspective on doctrine, 
preferring to assess contracts, torts, property, and so on 
through the lenses of other disciplines, especially economics. 
Without jettisoning the enormous insights to be gained from in-
terdisciplinary scholarship, I suggest that private law would 
benefit—and is benefiting
339
—from a metadoctrinal turn of its 
own. By juxtaposing problems of doctrinal design from consti-
tutional law and private law, we can shed light on questions of 
comparative institutional analysis that cut across legal do-
mains.
340
  
 
that private law insights as to the relationship between rights and remedies 
cast useful light on analogous questions in constitutional law); David E. Pozen, 
Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 11–12, 49 (2014) (im-
porting self-help ideas from private law into the constitutional law literature); 
Todd Rakoff, Washington v. Davis and the Objective Theory of Contracts, 29 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 63 (1994) (drawing on the law of contracts to illu-
minate constitutional law); D. Theodore Rave, Politicians As Fiduciaries, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 671, 677 (2013) (contending that politicians should be treated as 
fiduciaries, subject to a duty of loyalty). 
 339. See Goldberg, supra note 277, at 1655–60. 
 340. See Neil Komesar, The Logic of the Law and the Essence of Economics: 
Reflections on Forty Years in the Wilderness, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 265, 323 
(2013); see also Smith, supra note 305, at 849–51 (noting the relevance of com-
parative institutional analysis to questions of good faith in contracts).  
